1. bookVolume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)
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16 Apr 2017
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access type Open Access

Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock

Published Online: 06 Mar 2018
Page range: 219 - 243
Received: 27 Jul 2017
Accepted: 11 Feb 2017
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.

Keywords

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