1. bookVolume 50 (2017): Issue 1 (June 2017)
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
access type Open Access

ADAPTING LEGISLATIVE AGENDA SETTINGMODELS TO PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

Published Online: 31 Oct 2017
Page range: 181 - 203
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

This paper draws on Cox and McCubbins’ comparison of floor and cartel agenda models and adapts it to the context of multi-party parliamentary regimes with the goal of clarifying some important differences between the legislative consequences of cohesion and discipline, on the one hand, and the effects of agenda setting, on the other. Internal party discipline and/or preference cohesion receives the bulk of emphasis in comparative studies of empirical patterns of legislative behavior, generally without considering the role of the agenda. In a series of stylized models, this paper highlights important differences between having more unified parties and/or coalitions as a result of discipline and/or cohesion and the successful use of agenda control. We show that cohesion or discipline - understood as the ability to achieve voting unity - does not produce the same patterns of legislative behavior as negative agenda control. Data on legislative voting in the Polish Sejm are used to illustrate some points.

Keywords

Calvo, E. (2007). The responsive legislature: Public opinion and law making in a highly disciplined legislature. British Journal of Political Science, 37(02):263-280. 10.1017/S0007123407000130Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Calvo, E. and Sagarzazu, I. (2011). Legislator success in committee: gatekeeping authority and the loss of majority control. American Journal of Political Science, 55(1):1-15. 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00476.xOpen DOISearch in Google Scholar

Carroll, R. and Nalepa, M. (2013). Resources, enforcement and party discipline under candidate-centered pr. Unpublished Manuscript. Search in Google Scholar

Cox, G. W., Heller, W. B., and McCubbins, M. D. (2008). Agenda power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33(2):171-198. Search in Google Scholar

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (2005). Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge University Press. Search in Google Scholar

Curini, L. and Zucchini, F. (2011). Testing the law-making theories in a parliamentary democracy: A roll call analysis of the italian chamber of deputies (1988- 2008). In Reform Processes and Policy Change, pages 189-211. Springer. 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_9Search in Google Scholar

Denzau, A. T. and Mackay, R. J. (1983). Gatekeeping and monopoly power of committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior. American Journal of Political Science, pages 740-761. 10.2307/2110891Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Eccleston, R. and Marsh, I. (2011). The henry tax review, cartel parties and the reform capacity of the australian state. Australian journal of political science, 46(3):437-451. Search in Google Scholar

Nalepa, M. (2016). Party institutionalization and legislative organization: The evolution of agenda power in the polish parliament. Comparative Politics, 48(3):353-+. 10.5129/001041516818254428Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1979). Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4):563-587. 10.2307/1884470Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Zubek, R. (2011). Negative agenda control and executive-legislative relations in east central europe, 1997-2008. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(2):172-192.Search in Google Scholar

Recommended articles from Trend MD

Plan your remote conference with Sciendo