1. bookVolume 5 (2013): Issue 37 (November 2013)
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Journal
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2182-2875
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16 Apr 2017
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4 times per year
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English
access type Open Access

A Puzzle about Disagreement

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 283 - 297
Received: 16 Feb 2013
Accepted: 03 Jul 2013
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.

Keywords

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