1. bookVolume 55 (2018): Issue 1 (September 2018)
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
access type Open Access

“Even Though”: On the Different Functions of Discounting Expressions in Pro and Con Arguments

Published Online: 06 Dec 2018
Page range: 167 - 186
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

We often say things like “Even though X, Y” or “In spite of Y, X”. What do we mean when we say things like this? What does it imply about the reasons involved? I will argue that there are at least some cases, namely when they are used in the conclusions of conductive arguments, where it should be seen as modifying our expression of X and indicating a certain kind of affect towards X, and this is characteristic of (the most interesting class of) conductive arguments. Showing that there are such uses thus shows that there are conductive arguments, or at least arguments with this characteristic feature, and, conversely, it will be shown that it is by taking the reasoning to be conductive that we can best make sense of these uses. I do not intend a comprehensive survey of all possible uses of “even though” or of all accounts of conductive arguments that have been given.

Keywords

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