rss_2.0Disputatio FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Disputatio 's Cover Proportionality Argument and the Problem of Widespread Causal Overdetermination<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-03-13T00:00:00.000+00:00Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the <italic>fault of</italic> the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-03-13T00:00:00.000+00:00The Early Modern Origins of Pragmatism<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>This paper considers the alleged pragmatism of Berkeley’s philosophy using the two Sellarsian categories of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images of the world and human beings. The ‘manifest’ image is regarded as a refinement of the ordinary way of conceiving things, and the scientific image is seen as a theoretical picture of the world provided by science. The paper argues that the so-called Berkeleian pragmatism was an effect of Berkeley’s work towards a synthesis of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images through the creation of one unified synoptic vision of the world and was a part of a new conceptual framework within which these two images could be combined.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-03-13T00:00:00.000+00:00Two Informational Theories of Memory: a case from Memory-Conjunction Errors<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience (the causal condition). In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process (no causal condition). I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors (DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory-conjunction errors) as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one (and only one) target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-03-13T00:00:00.000+00:00Minding Strangers’ Business<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>When should we interfere in the course of a stranger’s life? While philosophers have discussed at length extreme cases of assisting poor people in famine stricken countries, much less attention has been given to casual, everyday episodes. If I overhear two people discussing a place they are about to visit, and know that it is closed for renovation, should I interfere and tell them so? If I stand next to a customer who has not been given enough change in the supermarket, should I point that out or mind my own business? Using the Kantian notions of love and respect, I answer such questions. I claim that Kant’s terminology is ill-suited for instructing us how to deal with others with whom we are personally involved, but is important for our encounters with strangers. I suggest that we take seriously Kant’s claim that we are “united in one dwelling place”. When around others, keep an open eye to the possibility that they might need help. If there is good reason to suppose that you may help, knock on their door. Let them decide whether they want to open it. They are totally entitled to decline the offer, but should keep in mind that it was given as part of the joint venture of living together with others. The interference should therefore not be regarded as an infringement of privacy.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-03-13T00:00:00.000+00:00The Web of Belief: Uma Perspectiva da Inteligência Artificial de Apresentação Paradoxo da Pergunta Propositions and Modes of Presentation Reviewões and Ways of Believing and the Regress Argument Logic of Constructivism<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>In this paper I dispute the current view that intuitionistic logic is the common basis for the three main trends of constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics: intuitionism, Russian constructivism and Bishop’s constructivism. The point is that the so-called ‘Markov’s principle’, which is accepted by Russian constructivists and rejected by the other two, is expressible in intuitionistic first-order logic, and so it appears to have the status of a logical principle. The result of appending this principle to a complete intuitionistic axiom system for first-order predicate logic constitutes a new logic, which could well be called ‘Markov’s logic’, and which should be regarded as the true logical system underlying Russian constructivism.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2018-12-31T00:00:00.000+00:00Referência E Denotação: Duas Funções Semânticas Irredutíveisícia Notice Embodied Cognition and Correspondence Truth: A Reply to Lakoff and Johnson Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization<p>I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.</p>ARTICLE2021-01-29T00:00:00.000+00:00Varieties of Logical Form<p>The paper reviews some conceptions of logical form in the light of Andrea Iacona’s book <italic>Logical Form</italic>. I distinguish the following: logical form as schematization of natural language, provided by, for example, Aristotle’s syllogistic; the relevance to logical form of formal languages like those used by Frege and Russell to express and prove mathematical theorems; Russell’s mid-period conception of logical form as the structural cement binding propositions; the conceptions of logical form discussed by Iacona; and logical form regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of language processing, as in the Discourse Representation Theory tradition. Whereas neither schematization, nor the use of special languages for mathematics, raise general methodological or empirical difficulties, other conceptions of logical form raise at least apparent problems.</p>ARTICLE2021-01-29T00:00:00.000+00:00Replies<p>In this paper I provide five separate responses, one for each of the contributed papers, in order to clarify some crucial aspects of the view defended in my book.</p>ARTICLE2021-01-29T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1