rss_2.0Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Sciencehttps://sciendo.com/journal/KJPShttps://www.sciendo.comKairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 's Coverhttps://sciendo-parsed-data-feed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/60b1904afed6e94115627b74/cover-image.jpg?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20210920T042105Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=604800&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA6AP2G7AKDOZOEZ7H%2F20210920%2Feu-central-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=8e9e1b99d5bbd3ea137b4ac8a502aee57db9a30923c42f8132149c14ecad1756200300Fernando R. Contreras, El Arte en la Cibercultura - Introducción a una Estética Comunicacional, Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2018https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0002ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Franck Jedrzejewski, Hétérotopies musicales: Modèles mathématiques de la musique (Paris, Hermann, 2019)https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0003ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Perspetivar a Integridade Depois do Fim da Naturezahttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0006<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The expression “end of nature” has been coined by American environ-mentalist Bill McKibben is his 1989 famous book, <italic>The End of Nature</italic>. Since then, the philosophical implications of such an obituary have been explored, mainly on an ethical perspective over the environment. The conceptual end of nature is one of those implications, in the context of a post-naturalistic environmental philosophy. Our purpose is to build upon the ambiguities of “nature” and reframe some readings of the concept of “integrity” as a guiding principle in the relation between human beings and the environment.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Equações Como Ícones (Seguidos Das Suas Peircianas “Verdades Insuspeitadas”)https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0007ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Jean-Yves Mercury, Chemins Avec et Autour de Merleau-Ponty (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2019)https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0001ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Hacking into Cybertherapy: Considering a Gesture-enhanced Therapy with Avatars (A)https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0004<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper will philosophically extend Julian Leff’s Avatar therapy paradigm (AT) for voice-like hallucinations that was initially proposed for treatment-resistant Schizophrenia patients into the realm of gesture-enhanced embodied cognition and Virtual Reality (VR), entitled <sup>g+T</sup>A (gesture-enhanced Avatar Therapy). I propose an philosophy of technology approach of embodied rhetorics of triadic kinetic “actions” in the sense of Charles Sanders Peirce that transforms the voice hallucination incorporated by an avatar- and that can confront acousmatic voice-like hallucinations with a method of gesture synchronization and dyssynchronization and gestural refusal of interaction that the player with the Avatar can resist in full embodiment. This paper therefore introduces a gesture-enhanced, extended version of Cybertherapy with Avatars that tackle multimodal bodily experience of voice-like hallucinations beyond mere visual or auditory stimulation. This is put forward theoretically in a 4E-cognition approach that expands Avatar Therapy with gestures into VR.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-28T00:00:00.000+00:00How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problemhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2016-0002<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action <italic>control</italic> with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston <italic>et al.</italic> 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanationshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2016-0001<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of <italic>pragmatism</italic>. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00Ortega y Gasset on Georg Cantor’s Theory of Transfinite Numbershttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2016-0003<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his effort to propose an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpretation of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in modern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he defined as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to intuition. Ortega argued that the infinite set cannot be present to the intuition and therefore there is no use to differentiate between cardinals of different infinite sets.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00Interview with Shahid Rahmanhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2016-0005ARTICLE2016-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00Uma avaliação do argumento ontológico modal de Plantingahttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2016-0004<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is (i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00The Conventionality of Simultaneity and Einstein’s Conventionality of Geometryhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2018-0008<p>The conventionality of simultaneity thesis as established by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is related to the partial freedom in the definition of simultaneity in an inertial reference frame. An apparently altogether different issue is that of the conventionality of spatial geometry, or more generally the conventionality of chronogeometry when taking also into account the conventionality of the uniformity of time. Here we will consider Einstein’s version of the conventionality of (chrono)geometry, according to which we might adopt a different spatial geometry and a particular definition of equality of successive time intervals. The choice of a particular chronogeometry would not imply any change in a theory, since its “physical part” can be changed in a way that, regarding experimental results, the theory is the same. Here, we will make the case that the conventionality of simultaneity is closely related to Einstein’s conventionality of chronogeometry, as another conventional element leading to it.</p>ARTICLE2018-08-20T00:00:00.000+00:00Metaphysics, Function and the Engineering of Life: the Problem of Vitalismhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2018-0006<p>Vitalism was long viewed as the most grotesque view in biological theory: appeals to a mysterious life-force, Romantic insistence on the autonomy of life, or worse, a metaphysics of an entirely living universe. In the early twentieth century, attempts were made to present a revised, lighter version that was not weighted down by revisionary metaphysics: “organicism”. And mainstream philosophers of science criticized Driesch and Bergson’s “neovitalism” as a too-strong ontological commitment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, over and above the system of causal relations studied by mechanistic science, rejecting the weaker form, organicism, as well. But there has been some significant scholarly “push-back” against this orthodox attitude, notably pointing to the 18th-century Montpellier vitalists to show that there are different historical forms of vitalism, including how they relate to mainstream scientific practice (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2018-0006_ref_053_w2aab3b7b6b1b6b1ab1ac53Aa">Wolfe and Normandin, eds. 2013</xref>). Additionally, some trends in recent biology that run counter to genetic reductionism and the informational model of the gene present themselves as organicist (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2018-0006_ref_034_w2aab3b7b6b1b6b1ab1ac34Aa">Gilbert and Sarkar 2000</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2018-0006_ref_049_w2aab3b7b6b1b6b1ab1ac49Aa">Moreno and Mossio 2015</xref>). Here, we examine some cases of vitalism <italic>in the twentieth century and today</italic>, not just as a historical form but as a significant metaphysical and scientific model. We argue for vitalism’s conceptual originality without either reducing it to mainstream models of science or presenting it as an alternate model of science, by focusing on historical forms of vitalism, logical empiricist critiques thereof and the impact of synthetic biology on current (re-)theorizing of vitalism.</p>ARTICLE2018-08-20T00:00:00.000+00:00Laws and Mechanisms in The Human Scienceshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2018-0004<p>According to an influential epistemological tradition, science explains phenomena on the basis of laws, but the last two decades have witnessed a neo-mechanistic movement that emphasizes the fundamental role of mechanism-based explanations in science, which have the virtue of opening the “black box” of correlations and of providing a genuine understanding of the phenomena. Mechanisms enrich the empirical content of a theory by introducing a new set of variables, helping us to make causal inferences that are not possible on the basis of macro-level correlations (due to well-known problems regarding the underdetermination of causation by correlation). However, the appeal to mechanisms has also a methodological price. They are vulnerable to interference effects; they also face underdetermination problems, because the available evidence often allows different interpretations of the underlying structure of a correlation; they are strongly context-dependent and their individuation as causal patterns can be controversial; they present specific testability problems; finally, mechanism-based extrapolations can be misleading due to the local character of mechanisms. At any rate, the study of mechanisms is an indispensable part of the human sciences, and the problems that they raise can be controlled by quantitative and qualitative methods, and an epistemologically informed exercise of critical thinking.</p>ARTICLE2018-08-20T00:00:00.000+00:00Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?https://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/kjps-2017-0001<p>In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.</p>ARTICLE2017-06-06T00:00:00.000+00:00Awareness Logic: an Epistemological Defence Correlations between Awareness Logic and Epistemologyhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0009<p>with this paper, we intend to clarify some of the central notions that are commonly used in contemporary developments of Epistemic Logic, which lack a proper theoretical foundation. We want to follow the steps of some prominent epistemologists and epistemic logicians, who advocate for a correlation between their respective fields of study. We will proceed with a first small step that will consist in adapting one contemporary version of Epistemic Internalism to the framework of Awareness Logic, such that the key concepts in this logic can be sustained by an epistemological view, which, in turn, can work as a theoretical foundation for Awareness Logic.</p>ARTICLE2020-03-03T00:00:00.000+00:00From Effect to Cause: Deductive Reasoninghttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0011<p>According to the traditional view, the following incompatibility holds true: in reasoning, either there is warrant (certainty) or there is novelty. If there is warrant, there is not novelty: that would be the case of deductive reasoning. If there is novelty, there is not warrant: that would be the case of inductive reasoning. Causal reasoning would belong to the second group because there is novelty and, therefore, there is not warrant in it. I argue that this is false: reasoning may have novelty and, nevertheless, be a deductive one. That is precisely what happens in (some) causal reasoning. And I will develop the following line of argumentation: one thing is to warrant that some state of affairs exists and other thing is to warrant that warrant. So we may have correct deductive reasoning without having certainty of that correction, like in some cases of causal reasoning.</p>ARTICLE2020-03-03T00:00:00.000+00:00Epistemology of Research on Radiation and Matter: a Structural Viewhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0016<p>The modern understanding of radiation got its start in 1895 with X-rays discovered by Wilhelm Röntgen, followed in 1896 by Henri Becquerel’s discovery of radioactivity. The development of the study of radiation opened a vast field of research concerning various disciplines: chemistry, physics, biology, geology, sociology, ethics, etc. Additionally, new branches of knowledge were created, such as atomic and nuclear physics that enabled an in-depth knowledge of the matter. Moreover, during the historical evolution of this body of knowledge a wide variety of new technologies was emerging. This article seeks to analyze the characteristics of experimental research in radioactivity and microphysics, in particular the relationship experience-theory. It will also be emphasized that for more than two decades, since the discovery of radioactivity, experiments took place without the theory being able to follow experimental dynamics. Some aspects identified as structural features of scientific research in the area of radiation and matter will be addressed through historical examples. The inventiveness of experiments in parallel with the emergence of quantum mechanics, the formation of teams and their relationship with technology developed from the experiments, as well as the evolution of microphysics in the sense of “Big Science” will be the main structural characteristics here focused. The case study of research in radioactivity in Portugal that assumes a certain importance and has structural characteristics similar to those of Europe will be presented.</p>ARTICLE2020-03-03T00:00:00.000+00:00The Ontological Concept of Disease and the Clinical Empiricism of Thomas Sydenhamhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0013<p>The clinical empiricism of Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689) and his definition of <italic>especie morbosae</italic> represented a substantial turn in the medicine of his time. This turn supposed the shift towards an ontological conception of diseases, from a qualitative to quantitative interpretation. Sydenham’s clinical proposal had a great influence on empiricism philosophical thinking, particularly in John Locke and his delimitation of knowledge. The dialogue between medicine and philosophy, set out by Sydenham-Locke, reactivates the problem of the clinical and theoretical foundations of medical thought, as well as the limits of scientific knowledge. Similar to problem exposed in the Hippocratic treatise <italic>On ancient medicine</italic>, seventeenth-century medicine seeks its epistemological foundations and the solution to its difficulties in clinical experience, probability and analogy. The aim of this work is to show the Sydenham’s contribution to one of the great controversies between medicine and philosophy.</p>ARTICLE2020-03-03T00:00:00.000+00:00Categorical Interpretation of Modal Structures under Bisimulationhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0008<p>In this work we summarise the concept of bisimulation, widely used both in computational sciences and in modal logic, that characterises modal structures with the same behaviour in terms of accessibility relations. Then, we offer a sketch of categorical interpretation of bisimulation between modal structures, which comprise both the structure and the valuation from a propositional language.</p>ARTICLE2020-03-03T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1