rss_2.0Phainomenon FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Phainomenonhttps://sciendo.com/journal/PHAINOMENONhttps://www.sciendo.comPhainomenon 's Coverhttps://sciendo-parsed-data-feed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/6285fadaa449ef015701a3cf/cover-image.jpg?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20220521T225403Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=604800&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA6AP2G7AKDOZOEZ7H%2F20220521%2Feu-central-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=7a101dfbfd093befe5ae6c26d1fd86155fba376ae4af8c0545a338415cc21b64200300Le roman entre inachèvement et clôturehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0017<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The novel gives us access to fictional universes in a fundamentally unfinished mode, which allows the reader to give free rein to his or her imagination, in a freedom that is nevertheless monitored and controlled by rules. This article tries to understand the nature of this incompleteness, by discussing some classical readings. How does this specific dimension of fiction relate to Umberto Eco’s concept of the “open work” or to the idea, developed by the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, that literary works are “schemas” destined to be “concretized” in the consciousness of the reader? How does Hans Robert Jauss’s aesthetics of reception help us to think about the incompleteness of the work in the proper time of its different readings? Through the fruitful dialogue of these different theories, it is a question of highlighting two important points. First, these theories, while discussing the respective roles of the author and the reader, neglect a a third character who is nevertheless essential to the fictional narrative, the narrator. However, taking into account the latter sheds light on the problems encountered. Secondly, this relationship between the incompleteness of the narrative and the narrator’s position is not in itself specific to fiction. It is not absent from scientific texts, when they are thought of as narratives about reality susceptible of different readings in their history.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00Virtuality and Truth. On Literature in Merleau-Ponty’s Indirect Ontologyhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0013<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper aims to investigate the importance of literature in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections concerning two strictly connected phenomenological themes: 1) the virtuality of objects and of existence itself; 2) the genesis of truth and the intuition of essences. According to Merleau-Ponty, modern novelists have adopted a phenomenological method: instead of ‘explaining’ the world through words, they ‘show’ the lifeworld and its paradoxes indirectly. In his view, and against Jean-Paul Sartre’s position, analyzing literature means developing a theory integrating perception and the imagination. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1950’s, this perspective led Merleau-Ponty to a deep revision of the Sartrian concepts of spontaneity and engagement in literary practice in favour of a theory of expression as style. As a conclusion, the paper argues for the key-role of literature in Merleau-Ponty’s indirect ontology as a way of rediscovering unity and harmony behind the metamorphosis of reality.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00: Phenomenology and Literaturehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0011ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00Phénoménologies « de » la littérature – phénomène, imagination, fictions littéraireshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0012<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper intends to offer a first sketch of a pluralist account of contemporary phenomenologies “of” literature. It does so (1) by distinguishing two phenomenological “families” — hermeneutical phenomenology and constitutive phenomenology —, illustrated by two different authors — Ricœur and Husserl —, each of which relies on a distinctive account of the notion of “phenomenon”— <italic>qua</italic> hidden entity providing the ground for what shows itself first and foremost, and <italic>qua</italic> intended unity of a multiplicity of conscious experiences —; (2) by fleshing out the two conceptions of “imagination” — productive imagination and <italic>phantasia</italic> — these accounts of the “phenomenon” give rise to; and finally, (3) by underlining the way in which these two phenomenological accounts lead to alternative ways of apprehending the specific phenomenon of fictional imagination — narrative literary imagination vs. reproductive <italic>phantasia</italic> of the narrative work — thus specifying two relevant senses in which the tasks of a “phenomenology <italic>of</italic> literature” could be understood. Such a complex path should enable us to justify the following claim: while hermeneutical phenomenology “of” literature aims at uncovering literature itself <italic>as</italic> a form of phenomenology, a constitutive phenomenology “of” literature rather understands its task as a way to clarify the fundamental concepts of a whole host of theoretical and practical disciplines <italic>about</italic> literature. Hence the ambiguity of the genitive “phenomenology <italic>of</italic> literature”, which could be read either as ascribing phenomenology <italic>to</italic> literature itself (subjective genitive), or as turning phenomenology <italic>towards</italic> literature (objective genitive). In its conclusion, this paper will tentatively assess the resources of a Husserl-inspired constitutive phenomenology of literature.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00Ingarden and Derrida on empty space in literaturehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0019<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article undertakes a comparative study of Ingarden and Derrida in regards to literature. It is being shown that the former’s concepts of ‘spots of indeterminacy’ and ‘empty spots’ resemble the latter’s notions of ‘spacing’ and ‘blanks’. Yet, although they both share a background in Husserlian phenomenology, it is argued that their ideas can hardly be equated to one another. Moreover, Derrida seemed to have avoided any association with Ingarden. This is due to their fundamentally different take on the literary work. Whereas Ingarden mainly considered the ontological nature of literature, Derrida took into account the broader context of the world in which literature takes place. For Ingarden, Derrida would have strayed too far from the subject matter. For Derrida, Ingarden hardly understood its complexity and only examined a small fragment of the issue: the question what makes us grasp literature as such. To Ingarden, those aspects were essential. To Derrida, they were merely objective rules.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00The contribution of “time novels” to a phenomenology of temporality. Thomas Mann, Martin Heidegger, and our experience of timehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0015<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper insists on similarities between Heidegger’s presentation of Dasein’s authentic understanding of time in <italic>Being and Time</italic> (§§ 79-80) and Thomas Mann’s attempts to “narrate time itself” in <italic>The Magic Mountain.</italic> It shows that Thomas Mann’s temporal experiments can contribute to a phenomenology of temporality, not merely by “illustrating” philosophical theses, but also by achieving something that goes beyond any phenomenological consideration on time: the enactment of fundamental temporal experiences.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00L’inépuisabilité de l’œuvre littéraire: Réflexion autour de L’œuvre ouverte de Umberto Ecohttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0016<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper focuses on the main claim of Umberto Eco’s <italic>Open Work</italic>, according to which any work of art is an inherently ambiguous message, <italic>i.e.</italic> is inexhaustible, or in principle likely to be the object of an infinite number of interpretations. It does so, first, by restricting itself to the specific topic of the literary work of art, and, secondly, by making a detour, that Eco himself suggests, though he does not really explore it, <italic>via</italic> Sartre’s ontological phenomenology. This detour will eventually lead the reader from <italic>Being and Nothingness</italic> to <italic>What is Literature?</italic>; from Sartre’s “theory of the phenomenon” to his description of the poetic and prosaic attitude; and from a theory of literature <italic>qua</italic> ambiguity-inexhaustibility to that of openness <italic>qua</italic> esthetic phenomenon. Finally, it is the capacity of Sartre’s phenomenology to ultimately clarify, or provide a foundation to, Eco’s own theory, as well as the latter’s originality with regard to the former, that will be studied and accounted for.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00Phenomenology and the Transformation of the Modern Novelhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0014<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article examines in what way and to what extent phenomenological philosophy has given rise to a new understanding of the modern novel and to a transformation of its narrative techniques. The starting point for this examination is the claim, made by Merleau-Ponty in “Metaphysics and the Novel”, according to which, in phenomenological philosophy, the task of philosophy is inextricably bound to that of literature. I examine this claim in two ways. First, I situate it historically with regard to the modern novel’s characteristic realism. Then, I show how the phenomenological attitude – formulated by Husserl as a methodological device in distinction with the natural attitude – transforms the novel’s narrative technics. Sartre’s first novel, La Nausée, constitutes an exemplary case to assess this transformation. Combining these two ways, I argue that the claim made by Merleau-Ponty is paradoxical: on the one hand, the intrinsic connection between phenomenological philosophy and literature promotes the cognitive value of the modern novel, but on the other hand, it breaks with the conventions of the novel form and initiates a fragmented writing.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00On the Phenomenon of Literary Empathyhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0018<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, drawing on Husserl, as well as on certain other phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and Richir, I claim that the phenomenon of the apprehension of the perspectives and emotions of literary characters deserves to be called <italic>literary empathy</italic>. In order to support this claim, I’ll firstly argue that empathy is principally an act of presentification closely related with perception, memory and imagination. Secondly, I’ll argue that <italic>literary empathy</italic> with literary characters is an imaginative reproduction of the reader’s bodily sedimentations under the instruction offered by the literary text. Thirdly, I’ll argue that through <italic>literary empathy</italic>, a reader forms a peculiar intersubjective link with the literary character. The subjects in play are thus the real existential “I” and the imagined Other. Asymmetry of existence-positing and lack of interaction do not prevent the imagined characters from exerting an effective influence upon the reader and reconfiguring her actual life.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-17T00:00:00.000+00:00Heidegger à conversa com Heideggerhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0001ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Heidegger and the Overcoming of His Transcendental Understanding of the “World”: from “” to “”https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0009<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This paper presents a paragraph of my thesis whose guiding thread is the theme of language in Heidegger, and which advances two basic claims: 1) <italic>Being and Time</italic> is an unfinished book and it is thus in the understanding of the planetary achievement of “nihilism” – i.e., of “technique” – that this work from 1927 assumes <italic>its whole meaning</italic>; and 2) that said, Heidegger’s work, taken as a whole, is a <italic>cohesive</italic> work that aims at overcoming “nihilism” understood originarily as “forgetfulness of being”. This overcoming is therefore achieved in two stages: 1) the understanding of the phenomenon of “being” arising from the transcendental understanding of the “world”; and 2) the overcoming of that transcendental understanding of the “world” in the full understanding of the phenomenon of “being” as “history,” a process in which the dialogue with poetry will prove to be decisive. This paper emphasizes one aspect of that evolution of Heidegger’s thought “in dialogue with Heidegger,” showing how the understanding of “Ereignis” allows us to conciliate the understanding of the concept of “Entschlossenheit,” presented in <italic>Being and Time,</italic> with the concept of “Gelassenheit,” that is central in the second stage of Heidegger’s work.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Book Review: Andrea Staiti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2020 160pp.https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0010ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Existe um antepredicativo pático? Uma possível leitura do percurso heideggerianohttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0005<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Although the term “pre-predicative” (<italic>vorprädikativ</italic>) is used only two times in <italic>Being and Time</italic>, it qualifies in an essential way the hermeneutical process in which the existentials of understanding, interpretation and discourse cooperate to structure the phenomenal field into a meaningful horizon. This hermeneutical function represents for Heidegger the precondition for every theoretical-predicative behaviour of <italic>Dasein</italic> towards being. By means of a conceptual-historical analysis throughout the Twenties, it is possible to point out that Heidegger considers the domain of the pre-predicative identical to the hermeneutical process. Nevertheless, on the basis of some indications that are to be found in Heidegger’s writings, we can trace the contours of a different history of the concept of “pre-predicative”, in which the latter hints at a deeper dimension of the human being – a dimension that can be designated as “pathic” or “prehermeneutical”. To this purpose, it is essential to investigate the concept of “pre-worldly” (<italic>vorweltlich</italic>), introduced by Heidegger in his first lecture course, his analysis of anxiety in 1929 and, finally, the image of the “great silence” (<italic>große Stille</italic>) in the later <italic>Contributions to Philosophy</italic>.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Passivity and Activity in the Heideggerian Description of Moodshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0007<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>This article considers the simultaneously passive and active character of moods (<italic>Stimmungen</italic>) in Heidegger, focussing on two different periods of his thought: the end of the 1920s and the middle of the 1930s. Through the study of the language used by Heidegger, I show that the ideas of passivity and activity are expressed in three different levels of his description of moods: the more concrete level of one’s experience of a mood, the level of philosophical analysis insofar as it is based on moods and deals with moods, and the transcendental or constitutive level of experience. Moreover, I show that in each of these levels passivity and activity are constitutively intertwined and that Heidegger’s conception of moods both in the 1920s and the 1930s can only be understood if we take into consideration the three levels and the way each of them is characterized by both passivity and activity.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00The path and the Conversation. Self-interpreting Heideggerhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In his quest to let language speak, Heidegger explored thoroughly the possibilities of meaning of factical language, in its phenomenological and poietic dimensions. He thereby came to characterize <italic>Being and Time</italic> as a way, a path which must be followed until it ends. He later understood it as a wandering and, finally, as a dead end (<italic>Holzweg</italic>). The idea of the walker, in conversation with himself, accompanies this entire journey. The present essay seeks to uncover the main moments of Heidegger’s retrospective and self-interpreting way, based on recent publications of the <italic>Gesamtausgabe</italic> (in particular GA 82 and 70.1), which he himself wanted to see, generally speaking, as the edition of his <italic>Wege, nicht Werke</italic>.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Heidegger in Conversation With Heideggerhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0002ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Existential spatiality in https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0004<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in <italic>Being and Time</italic> in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in <italic>Spheres I</italic> that Heidegger presented, in <italic>Being and Time</italic>, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of <italic>Being and Time</italic>), and taking into account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in <italic>Being and Time</italic>.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00The (Con)Text of a Footnote: Heidegger and the Factical and Pre-Ontological Aspects of Carehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2021-0006<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Right after the presentation of Hyginus’s fable in §42 of <italic>Being and Time</italic> comes a note in which Heidegger affirms that the orientation about care as the being of <italic>Dasein</italic> (§41) arose in the context of the interpretation of Augustinian anthropology and the foundations obtained by the analysis of Aristotelian ontology. Why such a mention and why is it placed precisely after proving the pre-ontological origin of care as the being of <italic>Dasein</italic>? Assuming such problem, this paper does not aim only at offering a reading key that justifies such note, but at presenting the importance of the factical and pre-ontological aspects presented, respectively, in <italic>Book X</italic> of <italic>The Confessions</italic> of Augustine and in the fable of Hyginus for Heidegger's elaboration of care as an ontological category. For this purpose, three lecture courses will be assumed, especially: <italic>Augustine and Neo-Platonism</italic> (1921), which will make it possible to perceive the always factical aspect of care, thus evidencing the historical enactment perspective of the hermeneutics of facticity; <italic>Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle</italic> (1921/1922), which will make it possible to understand the idea of “ontological category” as a first formulation of what, in <italic>Being and Time</italic>, will be the existentials; and <italic>History of the concept of time: prolegomena</italic> (1925), which will allow us to realize that care is about being and not having, therefore, that it is not a possession of <italic>Dasein</italic>, but a condition of its existence. Finally, after justifying the importance of different aspects for care as an ontological category, it will be understood why the ontological interpretation differs from both others.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Mundo-de-la-Vida, Intercorporeidad, Tierra: Merlean:-Ponty y Ia Fenomenologiahttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0006<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>One of the most important phenomenological problems that influenced Merleau-Ponty’s work is the idea of a comeback to the lifeworld like primordial ground as much of the individual philosophical reflection as of the intersubjective experience of knowledge. The aim of this paper is to highlight the character, in the same breath paradoxical and founding, of the otherness experience that, according to Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity involves. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty radicalizes this husserlian concept with the notion of <italic>intercorporeity.</italic> In this manner, what the French philosopher wants to carry out is not as much an external criticism to the phenomenology, but rather the radical phenomenological purpose to take phenomenology to its extremes limits. Questioning the dualism of empirical and transcendental, of sensible passivity and reflexive activity, of material exteriority and inner spiritual reality, the concept of intercorporeity refers to a kind of being that prevents from the pretension of a definitive foundation on the base of one of the two sides of this metaphysical polarity. In contrast with this dualism, and according to the Merleau-Ponty’s “new ontology”, the concept of intercorporeity has an outstanding relevance because announces the ontological co-existence of the human being with the Nature’s and Earth’s being.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-22T00:00:00.000+00:00A Transcendência do Esboço de uma descrição fenomenolágicahttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0014ARTICLE2021-10-22T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1