1. bookVolume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)
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Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination

Online veröffentlicht: 06 Mar 2018
Seitenbereich: 193 - 217
Eingereicht: 27 Jul 2017
Akzeptiert: 11 Feb 2017
Zeitschriftendaten
License
Format
Zeitschrift
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.

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