1. bookVolume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)
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Is Semicompatibilism Unstable?

Online veröffentlicht: 06 Mar 2018
Seitenbereich: 245 - 264
Eingereicht: 27 Jul 2017
Akzeptiert: 11 Feb 2017
Zeitschriftendaten
License
Format
Zeitschrift
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Recently, John Maier has developed a unified account of various agentive modalities (such as general abilities, potentialities, and skills). According to him, however, adopting the account provides an alternative framework for thinking about free will and moral responsibility, one that reveals an unacceptable instability in semicompatibilism (the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism even if the freedom to do otherwise is not). In this paper, I argue that Maier is mistaken about the implications of his account and sketch a semicompatibilist proposal that can, without countenancing any instability, accept Maier’s unified account of the agentive modalities.

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