<DIV align=justify> Why subscribe and read Disputatio aims at publishing high-quality articles on any aspects of analytical philosophy (broadly construed), written in either English or Portuguese. Why submit Disputatio is the leading philosophy journal in the Portuguese-speaking world. It has been classified in category Q2 of the SCImago Journal Rank for the third consecutive year and in category A2 of Qualis. It was also classified in category INT2 (previously B) of the 2011 ERIH ranking of the European Science Foundation and in category B in the 2010 Australian Association of Philosophy and the Australian Research Council ranking. Disputatio practices triple-blind refereeing. On average, the reviewing process takes around four months. Similarity Check Plagiarism Screening System The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. Detailed description of the Similarity Check System can be found at: <A href="https://www.crossref.org/services/similarity-check/">www.crossref.org/services/similarity-check/</A> <HR> Sponsors Disputatio is currently sponsored by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (UIDP/00310/2020). <IMG style="HEIGHT: 49px; WIDTH: 184px" alt="Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia" src="https://www.degruyter.com/staticfiles/images/journals/DISP_FCTlogo.jpg"> </DIV>

International Journal of Philosophy

Disputatio

Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller’s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller’s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.

Abstract

<article-title>Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism</article-title>

Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism

{"article-title":"Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism"}

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.

Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon

<article-title>On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts</article-title>

On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts

{"article-title":"On an argument of Segal\u2019s against singular object-dependent thoughts"}

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.

<article-title>A defence of Fregean propositions</article-title>

{"article-title":"A defence of Fregean propositions"}

According to Jamie Whyte, the proper assignment of fulfilment conditions to an agent’s set of desires proceeds in three steps. First, one identifies various desire extinction and behavioural reinforcement conditions to obtain the fulfilment conditions of a certain subset of the agent’s desires. With these fulfilment conditions in hand, one then appeals to a principle connecting desire fulfilment conditions with belief truth conditions to obtain the truth conditions of a number of the agent’s beliefs. Finally, one uses these belief truth conditions to generate, via a third principle, the fulfilment conditions for the remaining desires. There is, however, a very straightforward reason why this strategy cannot yield the required results.

<article-title>Whyte on desire fulfilment conditions: a simple problem</article-title>

Whyte on desire fulfilment conditions: a simple problem

{"article-title":"Whyte on desire fulfilment conditions: a simple problem"}

In a recent book, <italic>The Problem of the Soul</italic>, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration.

<article-title>Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation</article-title>

Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation

{"article-title":"Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation"}

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Editors-in-Chief Ricardo Santos (University of Lisbon) Elia Zardini (Universidad Complutense Madrid) Managing Editors José Mestre (University of Lisbon) Diogo Santos (University of Lisbon) Advisory Board Daniel Dennett (Tufts University) Michael Devitt (City University of New York) Kit Fine (New York University) Manuel García-Carpintero (University of Barcelona) Paul Horwich (New York University) Christopher Peacocke (University of Columbia) Pieter Seuren (Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics) Charles Travis (King’s College London) Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) Editorial Board Helen Beebee (University of Manchester) João Branquinho (University of Lisbon) Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra) Annalisa Coliva (University of Irvine) Josep Corbí (University of Valencia) Esa Díaz-León (University of Barcelona) Paul Égré (Institut Jean Nicod) Fernando Ferreira (University of Lisbon) Roman Frigg (London School of Economics) Pedro Galvão (University of Lisbon) Manuel García-Carpintero (University of Barcelona) Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (University of Stockholm) Adriana Silva Graça (University of Lisbon) Sally Haslanger (MIT) Guido Imaguire (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) António Lopes (University of Lisbon) Ofra Magidor (University of Oxford) Teresa Marques (University of Barcelona) José Martínez (University of Barcelona) Manuel Pérez-Otero (University of Barcelona) Josep Prades (University of Girona) Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh) Wlodek Rabinowicz (University of Lund) Sònia Roca (University of Stirling) Sven Rosenkranz (University of Barcelona) Marco Ruffino (UNICAMP) Pablo Rychter (University of Valencia) Pedro Santos (University of Algarve) Jennifer Saul (University of Sheffield) Célia Teixeira (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) David Yates (University of Lisbon) Technical Editor José Mestre (University of Lisbon) Publisher De Gruyter Poland Bogumiła Zuga 32A Str. 01-811 Warsaw, Poland T: +48 22 701 50 15

<DIV align=justify> Disputatio is an international journal of philosophy in the analytic tradition. It is currently owned by the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon and managed by the LanCog research group. The journal is a non-profit publishing venture. Since 2013, it has been published exclusively online as a fully open access journal. Disputatio was founded in 1996 by a group of philosophers led by João Branquinho, including António Branco, Fernando Ferreira, Frederico Marques and João Sàágua. It was published by the Portuguese Philosophical Society until 2002. Former editors include M.S. Lourenço, Fernando Ferreira, João Branquinho, Teresa Marques and Célia Teixeira. Since 2017, the journal has been jointly edited by Ricardo Santos and Elia Zardini. Rejection Rate: <UL> <LI>80% </LI></UL> </DIV>

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