1. bookVolume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)
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2182-2875
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16 Apr 2017
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access type Accès libre

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Volume & Edition: Volume 13 (2021) - Edition 61 (November 2021)
Pages: 143 - 158
Détails du magazine
License
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première parution
16 Apr 2017
Périodicité
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais
Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Keywords

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