The Impact of Brexit on the EU Development Policy: Selected Political Issues

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Abstract: The European Union (EU) is the most generous donor of international development cooperation—it transfers more than a half of the world's Official Development Assistance (ODA). In fact, the EU development policy is depending on three major contributors: France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), which are also among the top countries making the largest transfers to development cooperation. However, special attention should be paid to the UK, belonging to the avant-garde of international development cooperation. The United Kingdom is not only a part of the EU assistance wallet but also an important partner in shaping the development policy. This article attempts to answer the main research question: what impact will Brexit have on the EU development policy? The analysis covers the political plane, and the following elements will be taken into consideration: the impact of the UK's withdrawal from the organisation on shaping the EU development policy (its geographical and thematic concentration), and the ability to fulfil development commitments, which were undertaken by the Member States and the organisation. Consequently, Brexit may lead to reshaping the EU partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), as well as undermine the EU's ability to meet its obligations in the development area.

Keywords: *Brexit, development aid, EU development cooperation, EU development policy, the United Kingdom*

1. The impact of Brexit on the EU development policy. Selected political issues

The European Union (EU) is the most generous donor of international development cooperation—it transfers more than a half of the world's Official Development Assistance (ODA). In each year of the 21st century, it financed from 44.41% (in 2014) to 52.99% (2001) of total aid transfers, and in recent years it was: 50.99% (2015), 52.03% (2016), 51.82% (2017), and 52.63% (2018) of global ODA (OECD, 2019a). In this field of activity, the organisation relies in particular on the strength of its Member States, since they finance the vast majority of instruments through which the EU implements development cooperation, and also participate in bilateral and other multilateral aid. The sum of their efforts, thanks to parallel competences in this area (TFEU, 2012, Art. 4, 208), guarantees the EU a leading position in development assistance. In fact, the EU ODA is depending on three major contributors: France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), which are also among the top countries making the largest transfers to development cooperation. Since 2014, they have been financing over 60% of EU assistance.

However, special attention should be paid to the UK. Over the past two decades, the state has systematically increased its involvement in international ODA, transferring from over 5.3 bn US dollars (2000) to over 18.4 bn US dollars (2018) per year. Thanks to this, the percentage share of the UK in total development assistance also increased—from 7.19% in 2000 to 11.67% in 2018. This allowed London to be the fifth largest global donor in 2000–2007, and then to be promoted to the third position (after the United States and Germany) (OECD, 2019a). Until now, the EU has also benefited from the United Kingdom's interest in development cooperation by financing its activities in two main ways: from its general budget (the section devoted to external actions) and the European Development Fund (EDF). So far, the UK (being one of 28 countries) has financed the general budget of the EU in one-tenth (European Commission, 2018), and the last two editions of EDF—in nearly 15% each (Internal agreement, 2006; 2013). This means that after London's withdrawal from the EU, the organisation's budget for ODA may be significantly reduced in proportion to the gap that Brexit will create (Olivie & Pérez, 2017). On the other hand, the EU will remain the most generous ODA donor in the world, but without the UK's shares it will no longer provide over a half of the aid, but just over 40%. However, it is worth noting that the UK is not only a very rich part of the EU development cooperation wallet but also an important partner in its implementation.

Therefore, Brexit will bring not only financial but also political consequences for the EU development policy.

Thus, this article attempts to answer the main research question: what impact will Brexit have on the EU development policy? The analysis will cover the political plane, and the following elements will be taken into consideration: the impact of the UK's withdrawal from the organisation on shaping the EU development policy, and the ability to fulfil development commitments which were undertaken by the Member States and the organisation. In view of this research problem, it is necessary to formulate additional questions: What influences the shape of the EU development cooperation, primarily its geographical and sectoral (thematic) concentration, and what development commitments has the EU made and how are they fulfilled? In this context, I take into account the fact of finalisation of Brexit, irrespectively of its final option. I do not consider the Brexit variants, because regardless of whether it will be based on the existing withdrawal agreement (Agreement 2019/C 144 I/01), a revised arrangement or a no-deal version, development cooperation is not the priority of exit negotiations.

The study was based mainly on an analysis of content and documents regulating the EU's development cooperation and on an analysis of statistical data on the EU and the UK ODA. It is worth noting that the EU development assistance in the debate about the anticipated effects of Brexit is not a priority issue, especially in the context of political consequences.

2. Brexit and designing the EU development policy

The United Kingdom is not only one of the financial pillars of the EU development policy but also plays an important role in shaping the organisation's development cooperation strategy, including its sectoral (thematic) and geographical concentration. However, in the 21st century, the impact of individual members on the EU ODA programmes is limited—primarily due to implementation of globally set priorities. Firstly, the international agreement of the United Nations (the Millennium Declaration) set out eight Millennium Development Goals to be achieved in 2000–2015 (UN, 2000), and the Agenda 2030 identified another seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015a). Among them were overarching tasks, related to the reduction and final elimination of poverty, preventing hunger and malnutrition, improving health care, increasing access to education,

promoting the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law or environmental protection.

Meanwhile, it is worth paying attention to the fact that reducing, and ultimately eradicating, poverty became the main goal of development cooperation conducted by the EU only under the Lisbon Treaty (Consolidated version of the TFEU, 2012, Art. 208), and earlier such a provision was proposed by the un-ratified Constitution for Europe (Treaty..., 2004, Art. III-316). By gaining legitimacy in the Maastricht Treaty, development cooperation was primarily to foster “the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries” (Treaty..., 1992, Art. 130u). Such shaping of development assistance priorities resulted from its genesis, reaching back to the association of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. On the one hand, the partnership was to serve the development of these areas, but on the other—to establish and strengthen close economic relations between them and the Community. The accession of the United Kingdom has led to a reorientation of priorities in this area, paying more attention to the least developed countries (LDCs) in the world (however, this was also partly motivated by the national interest, especially related to strengthening the Commonwealth). Moreover, the UK was and is seen as an active member of the international community, playing a leading role in shaping the global development agenda (OECD, 2014), concentrated on poverty reduction (as indicated in the British International Development Act of 2002), and effectively realising actions in this field (HM Government, 2005, p. 26; Bond, 2019, pp. 12–16). The focus of the UK’s assistance on poverty reduction may be proved by statistics in ODA spending in LDCs, where it is a priority activity. For example, since 2010, the United Kingdom has allocated significantly more to this sector than the other two major contributors of the EU development cooperation, Germany and France (Fig. 1).

In this context, especially on the UK’s side, concerns arise whether Brexit will affect the EU development cooperation—despite global commitments and agendas—like turning again towards pursuing the organisation’s own, mainly economic, interests. It was London that initiated many of the actions targeted at LDCs. Simon Maxwell, the former director of the European Think Tanks Group, believes that “If we are not there [in the EU], the European programme will be less poverty-focused than it is likely to be if we are. We

Figure 1. Distribution of net ODA to Least Developed Countries by the United Kingdom, Germany and France in 2010–2017

Data source: OECD, 2019b

have been a force for the argument for poverty reduction” (Corrected oral evidence, 2018). In fact, the UK sees itself as a main force in focusing the EU development assistance on poverty eradication (DFID, 2009, p. 111). Yet, this issue is particularly important, as the UK’s promotion of this orientation in ODA at the EU forum was consequently confirmed by the international community, inter alia, by the OECD. For example, the OECD already in 2001 emphasised that “DFID [the UK’s Department for International Development] has been advocating that the EC [the European Community] increase its focus on poorer countries” (OECD, 2001, p. 31), and in 2006, in turn, noted that “the UK development priority of its EU presidency [in 2005] has notably been to secure decisions related to poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS, development in Africa and revision of the EC’s Development Policy to improve aid effectiveness” (OECD, 2006, p. 35). The UK’s development actions in the following years met with a similar OECD’s assessment. At the dawn of a new decade, in the context of the EU, “the UK has played a key role in arguing for a continued international focus on poverty reduction, despite the recent economic and financial turbulence” (OECD, 2010, p. 25), while in 2014, due to the UK’s efforts in aligning European trade policies with development aims, “important contributions to making trade systems work better for poor countries” were appreciated (OECD, 2014, p. 25).

The aforementioned post-2015 agenda also recommended that 0.15–0.2% of GNI on ODA should be directed to the LDCs group (UN CDP, 2018), and that 0.7% of GNI should be transferred to developing countries, which somehow indicated the geographical target of development activities. Nevertheless, shaping of the geographical concentration of the EU development cooperation was also affected by the UK's accession to the organisation. Considering the fact that colonial powers dominated among the Communities' founding countries, identifying their political, economic and social interest in various regions of the world, it was not surprising that the OCTs association firstly embraced countries and non-European territories, maintaining special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Most of them were located in Africa.¹

The accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 resulted in a significant enlargement of the group of associated overseas and territories, as well as the extension of the association's scope beyond Africa.² Shortly thereafter (in 1975), the involvement of areas related to the UK led to the signing of the first Lomé Convention, regulating the relations between the Communities and OCTs, which have since formed the ACP group (African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States) (Prince, 2016, pp. 500–502). In this way, the United Kingdom influenced the diversification of the geographical concentration of development assistance provided by the Communities. Importantly, the ACP countries (also due to the Cotonou Agreement) are still the main recipients of EU ODA. For example, from the 22.6 bn euros budget of the 10th EDF, as much as 21.9 bn euros was allocated to ACP states (286 mln euros for OCTs) (Internal agreement, 2006), while from 30.5 bn euros of the 11th EDF more than 29.0 bn euros was directed to ACP (364.5 mln euros for OCTs) (Internal agreement, 2013).

¹ French West Africa: Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta; French Equatorial Africa: Central Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gabon; Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Comoros, Madagascar and dependent territories, French Somalia, New Caledonia and dependent territories, French Colonies of Oceania, French Southern and Antarctic Territories; Autonomous Republic of Togo; trust territory of Cameroon under French management; Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi; trust territory of Somalia under Italian management; New Dutch Guinea. (Traité..., 1957, Annexe IV)

² Then: Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, The Bahamas, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Honduras, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Solomon Islands, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Associated States in the Caribbean: Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia, St Vincent, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Central and Southern Line Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St Helena and Dependencies, The Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands. (Treaty..., 1972, Art. 24)

Brexit, in this case, the cessation of the UK's interest, may result in diminishing the importance of countries and territories with special relations with the UK (especially Caribbean and Pacific ones) in the EU development policy (Clegg, 2016, p. 551; Kennes, 2018, pp. 9–12). It is worth paying attention to this issue, even though the European Commission's initial proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 does not confirm this concern. The new assumption of the Commission is to create one, more flexible tool through which activities will be carried out to eliminate poverty, as well as to promote sustainable development, prosperity, peace and stability. Therefore, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is planned to combine funds for external actions which so far were allocated in the general budget of the EU and the European Development Fund. According to this proposal, expenditure on the implementation of development goals is going to increase (89.2 bn euros was initially allocated to NDICI, i.e., more than 7 bn euros than in total from the general budget for external activities and the 11th Fund in the period 2014–2020) (Proposal COM(2018) 460 final). The geographical distribution of funds from the 10th EDF, the 11th EDF and the designed NDICI is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Geographical distribution of funds from the 10th EDF, the 11th EDF and the new NDICI

Data source: Internal agreement, 2006; 2013; Proposal COM(2018)460 final

Nevertheless, it is highly possible that the budget of the new external actions instrument will be reduced. First of all, because it is the area most liable to cuts during negotiations on the MFF between the Member

States. That was reflected in the financial framework 2014–2020—from the European Commission’s proposal for budgeting foreign activities at 70 bn euros remained just over 50 bn euros (Communication COM(2011)500 final). Secondly, because the core of the ACP group is constituted by African countries—49 African states participate in the association, 16 are Caribbean, and 15 are Pacific. The superiority of sub-Saharan Africa in the EU’s development cooperation can be seen even in the initial NDICI budget proposal (as indicated above). Then, reducing the assistance directed towards the Caribbean and Pacific countries may be easier for the Member States which remain in the EU after Brexit (the UK was their most important “constructive ally” in any EU discussion; Byron, 2019). Moreover, greater emphasis on maintaining support for Africa (compared to other regions) can be backed up not only by the other Western European countries’ (mainly France’s) influence in this area but also by the fact that 33 countries from the 47 on the UN Least Developed Countries List are located in this continent (UN CDP, 2018). This, in turn, would bring Member States closer to meeting their international obligations in the field of spending ODA.

However, there is also a risk that LDCs will feel the effect of the UK’s exit from the EU the most. Depending on the final form of Brexit, restored barriers and trade restrictions may adversely affect some of them (especially in the case of no-deal withdrawal) (Coke-Hamilton, 2019). In the short term, lower UK demand may occur, which will reduce LDCs exports. Furthermore, trade and investment restrictions between the EU and the UK may have an impact on development. Nonetheless, in the long term, the key issue will be the type of the UK trade regime with developing countries affecting the UK’s import, as well as the economic growth in the EU and the UK, which may decrease due to difficulties in bilateral relations between the parties, and which will also indirectly affect developing countries (Mendez-Parra *et al.*, 2016, p. 3). In consequence, this may also result in a diminution in the EU support for the Caribbean and Pacific Commonwealth countries (Lightfoot *et al.*, 2017, pp. 517–524).

On the other hand, post-Brexit relations between the UK and the Commonwealth may also be an important context for shaping the EU development cooperation. Despite political declarations (Johnson, 2018), it is not possible for the United Kingdom to completely replace participation in the EU with enhanced cooperation under the Commonwealth (Gulati, 2019). Therefore, it is worth noting that out of 53 Commonwealth countries, as many as 42 are involved in the EU–ACP partnership, representing more than a half of the countries in this group. As well as countries maintaining

special relations with the UK, participating in the association may weaken after the UK's withdrawal (by losing an important ally), and Brexit may weaken the position of the Union in negotiating the terms of the deal, which will be the successor to the Cotonou Agreement (because of the reshaped UK's influence on the Commonwealth) (Henökl, 2018, p. 3).

3. Brexit and the EU's commitments to development

Another issue is questioning by Brexit the credibility of the EU in implementing its own commitments. One of the most important commitments in the area of development policy made by the EU was that arising from The European Consensus on Development of 2005 (which was an EU response for the Monterrey Consensus and MDGs action plan). Already then the organisation determined the desired value of ODA financed by its Member States at the level of 0.7% of their GNI. This goal should have been achieved by 2015 and preceded by the achievement of the amount of 0.56% of GNI on ODA by 2010. At the same time, this recommendation was clarified and adapted to the diverse attainments of particular countries in this matter.³ Therefore, in 2015, three goals were to be achieved: reaching a value of 0.7% of GNI on ODA by some countries, maintaining a value higher than 0.7% of GNI on ODA by some countries, accomplishing the target of 0.33% of GNI on ODA by new EU countries (Joint statement 2006/C 46/01). The need to provide 0.7% of GNI to ODA for developing countries in the second decade of the 21st century was also repeated by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations, 2015b, pp. 26–27) and another UN global strategy (the post-2015 one—the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) (United Nations, 2015a). This commitment—without any preferential provisions for Member States—was also upheld by The New European Consensus on Development of 2017. This target, according to the agendas, should be achieved by 2030 (Joint statement 2017/C 210/01).

A significant fact in this context is that the implementation of this financial commitment was planned firstly within 10 years, and when it proved impossible—within the next 15 years. However, at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, it must be stated that achieving this goal in a

³ States that in 2005 had not yet reached the 0.51% GNI for ODA threshold, were obliged to implement it by 2010, while those above this ceiling—to maintain their efforts. In turn, the countries that joined the EU after 2002 and which did not reach the level of 0.17% of GNI on ODA in 2005, were recommended to meet this financial target by 2010 (similarly, new EU members meeting this criterion were obliged to continue their efforts).

quarter of a century may still prove to be too ambitious (Table 1, Annex). This issue quite clearly reflects, on the one hand, the differences (primarily economic) between the Member States, and on the other, the level of their attachment (or lack thereof) to development assistance.

In 2005, the ODA threshold of 0.51% of GNI was exceeded in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden (at the same time, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden already reached the 0.7% of GNI / ODA target). Below this level remained: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. However, none of the new EU countries reached the 0.17% of GNI threshold. Among the countries that should reach the GNI value of 0.51% in 2010, Finland and Ireland succeeded, while the United Kingdom, as well as Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, exceeded the value of 0.56% GNI per ODA. Cyprus and Malta also donated over 0.17% of GNI to ODA. In turn, in 2015, the basic goal of 0.7% of GNI to ODA was achieved by Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, while none of the countries which accessed the EU after 2002 exceeded its 0.33% GNI threshold. After ten years, a precondition of 2005 (0.51% of GNI) was met by Finland and Germany. The latest available data (from 2017) shows that ODA's share of government expenditures above 0.7% is present only in Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Germany is relatively close to this threshold (Fig. 3) (OECD, 2019a).

The value of Official Development Assistance provided by the UK in the years 2000–2017 was liable to fluctuations, but from a perspective of nearly two decades, it has increased significantly. Since 2013, the value of the UK's ODA fluctuates around 0.7% of GNI. Therefore, according to The European Consensus on Development, the United Kingdom, in 2005 not exceeding the 0.51% of GNI per ODA threshold, undertook to achieve it in 2010, but then it already reached the higher value, obliging more advanced in development assistance countries. Soon afterwards—as one of the few Member States—it realised the most important financial commitment of the EU development policy (Baker *et al.*, 2018).

Considering the above data, one can have doubts regarding the credibility of the EU Member States in fulfilling their obligations undertaken within the organisation (raised over time to the rank of global commitments). All the more, this credibility will suffer after Brexit. The United Kingdom is one of the few countries that has implemented the EU assumption in terms of spending on ODA. However, there are also doubts whether—in the face of economic turmoil resulting from leaving the EU—the UK itself will keep

Figure 3. The EU Member States' expenditures on ODA in 2017 (% of GNI)

Data source: OECD, 2019a

its commitments (Barder, 2016). However, certainly, the implementation of the goals adopted by the EU (dated to 2030) will have to face the short-term pressure arising from Brexit. Its consequence should be an increase in spending on ODA in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (Anderson & Mitchell, 2016), which is still not a foregone conclusion.

4. Conclusions

The United Kingdom is one of the financial and political pillars of the EU development policy. London has strongly influenced the shape of the EU's geographical and thematic interests in the field of aid. The UK's accession to the EU led to the expansion of the scope of the organisation's external association and allowed it to go beyond the African direction, previously promoted by the founding states of the Communities, because of their historical relationships and economic matters. The inclusion of countries and territories with special relations with the United Kingdom quickly led to the creation of the ACP group, which is still the main direction of the EU development cooperation. In this regard, Brexit may have the following effects: (1) minimising the significance of the countries that joined the group on the UK's initiative in the ACP partnership; (2) re-focusing attention

on African states with which other Member States, mainly France, have deeper relations, and which constitute the core of the LDCs group (African concentration is also declared by Germany; however, a gap in allocation to LDCs may still be seen in this case; OECD, 2018); (3) hindering negotiations of the new partnership agreement with ACP due to the fact that the majority of its members belong to the Commonwealth. At the same time, there are fears that LDCs will suffer the most from Brexit. Development aid to these countries may be hit, by ricochet, by the newly created barriers in economic relations between the EU and the UK and by the following turmoil, which may lead to a reduction in their economic growth. An important threat may also be the fact that the EU will turn towards middle-developed countries and territories in which poverty reduction is not the main priority, as it was the UK which initiated a significant part of anti-poverty activities. On the other hand, the concentration of the UK's aid is also evolving. As indicated in the 2015 Strategy, its main objectives are: "strengthening global peace, security and governance; strengthening resilience and response to crises; promoting global prosperity; tackling extreme poverty and helping the world's most vulnerable" (DFID, 2015, p. 3). While the attachment to pursuing the national interest is becoming more apparent in recent years (Krutikova & Warwick, 2017), it is harder to recognise the UK as the only and traditional guarantor of poverty elimination orientation in the EU.

Further effects of Brexit may also weaken the credibility of the EU in fulfilling its commitments. In 2005, under The European Consensus on Development, the EU made a pioneering decision to transfer 0.7% of GNI to ODA. This level should have been achieved by members in 2015 at the latest, taking into account the economic diversification between the states, allowing the new EU countries to achieve 0.33% of GNI in this matter. This obligation was poorly implemented, so it was upheld in 2017 by The New European Consensus on Development, which was a response to the global Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. Therefore, in 2015, the United Nations also made a commitment to provide ODA at 0.7% of GNI by 2030. Meanwhile, as available data indicate, among the EU Member States only Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom are fulfilling this obligation, and Germany, consequently increasing ODA funds, is close to achieving it. Other Member States (including the third pillar of the EU development policy—France) are still below the threshold, even those partially set in 2005. The level of realisation of this commitment leaves doubts as to whether they can be achieved even in 2030. It also shows the diverse involvement of states in development cooperation. Therefore, the credibility of the Union in this

respect will be further undermined by Brexit, as one of the few countries which fulfils the financial promise will cease to be a Member State.

One may also wonder to what extent will the international position of the EU, which is largely based on the status of the most generous ODA donor, suffer because of Brexit (Kugiel, 2017, pp. 67–69). First of all, the withdrawal means a potential significant reduction on the ODA budget allocated by the EU with its Member States (Olivie & Pérez, 2018, pp. 25–26). In this context, Brexit may lead to a depreciation of the EU's position in the world (Koenig, 2016, p. 5), because the EU will no longer donate more than a half of global ODA. Although, it will remain the most generous global donor (after deducting the UK's spending on ODA, the EU will supply not more than 50% of global assistance, but just over 40%) (OECD, 2019a). So far, the EU has primarily attracted by its prosperity, being also a desirable partner for third countries. Along with Brexit, the Union's attraction force is likely to decrease, and, above all, its attractiveness will be undermined (Henökl, 2018, p. 64). It turns out that this prosperity is no longer interesting enough even for its Member States. Then, the question arises whether it will be sufficiently credible to other countries, in particular those who are partners and recipients of the EU assistance. Furthermore, Brexit will set a dangerous precedent and at the same time an argument for Eurosceptics from other countries and can have a spillover effect (which may also have an impact on the EU development cooperation). For these reasons and in the face of many unknowns, further research in this matter is necessary.

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Annex

Table 1. The EU Member States' expenditures on ODA 2000–2017
(% of GNI)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
AT	0.23	0.34	0.25	0.20	0.23	0.52	0.47	0.50	0.43
BE	0.36	0.37	0.43	0.60	0.41	0.53	0.50	0.43	0.48
BG	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CY	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.09	0.14	0.17	0.16
CZ	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12
DK	1.06	1.03	0.96	0.84	0.85	0.81	0.80	0.81	0.82
EE	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10
FI	0.31	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.46	0.40	0.39	0.44
FR	0.30	0.31	0.37	0.40	0.41	0.47	0.47	0.38	0.38
DE	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38
GR	0.20	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.21
HU	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.07
IE	0.29	0.33	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.42	0.54	0.55	0.59
IT	0.13	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.15	0.29	0.20	0.19	0.22
LV	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.01	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.60	0.07
LT	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.11
LU	0.70	0.77	0.78	0.86	0.79	0.79	0.89	0.92	0.97
MT	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
NL	0.84	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.73	0.82	0.81	0.81	0.80
PL	0.02	0.02	n/a	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.07
PT	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.22	0.63	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.27
RO	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.09
SK	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.07	n/a	0.10	0.09	0.10
SI	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13
ES	0.22	0.30	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.37	0.45
SE	0.80	0.77	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.94	1.02	0.93	0.98
UK	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.36	0.47	0.51	0.35	0.43

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
AT	0.30	0.32	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.35	0.42	0.30
BE	0.55	0.64	0.54	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.42	0.50	0.45
BG	n/a	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.11
CY	0.20	0.23	0.16	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.09	n/a	n/a
CZ	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.15
DK	0.88	0.91	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.86	0.85	0.75	0.74
EE	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.16
FI	0.54	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.59	0.55	0.44	0.42
FR	0.47	0.49	0.46	0.45	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.43
DE	0.35	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.38	0.42	0.52	0.70	0.67
GR	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.19	0.16
HU	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.11
IE	0.54	0.52	0.51	0.47	0.46	0.37	0.32	0.32	0.32
IT	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.27	0.30
LV	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.10
LT	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.13
LU	1.04	1.05	0.97	1.00	1.00	1.06	0.95	1.00	1.00
MT	0.18	0.18	0.25	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.20	0.21
NL	0.82	0.81	0.75	0.71	0.67	0.63	0.75	0.65	0.60
PL	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.15	0.13
PT	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.16	0.17	0.18
RO	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11
SK	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.13
SI	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.19	0.16
ES	0.46	0.43	0.29	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.12	0.34	0.19
SE	1.12	0.97	1.02	0.95	1.01	1.09	1.40	0.94	1.02
UK	0.51	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70

Data source: OECD, 2019a

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