Original Contributions - Originalbeiträge

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Kinesthetic Unity as Motivated Association

1. Introduction: Kinesthetic Sensations and the Role of Spontaneity

In the *Ding und Raum Vorlesungen*, Husserl has described kinesthetic sensations as phenomena belonging to pure consciousness: they are sensations of motion (Husserl, 1973b, pp. 154–163). The flowing of these sensations in consciousness assumes the form of a temporal continuum of succession and, since motion is defined by Husserl as the basic form of alteration, the kinesthetic flow is a continuum of alteration (Bernet, Kern, & Marbach, 1993, p. 133).

Terminologically the reference to the notion of “kinesthesia” was introduced by Alexander Bain (1894), who had taken it from the nineteenth-century psychology with respect to muscular sensations (Husserl, 1973b, p. xxiv); within phenomenology, as well, kinestheses remain related to the bodily organism, but in a way that must not account for physiological structure. In fact, the phenomenological analysis moves exclusively within the compass of phenomenologically reduced data and hence only the perceptual experience furnishes the phenomenological givenness of a thing.

Kinestheses are experienced as bodily organic capabilities (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) by virtue of the reciprocal and irreducible relationship of dependency between kinesthesia and body. However, among the kinesthetic sensations of motion we can distinguish between the receptive sensations of the bodily organism and the sensations of the spontaneous “I can.” This notion is quite difficult to summarize, but at this level we will only mention it to underline the link with the dimension of practical possibility, i.e., the kinesthetic consciousness corresponding to the claim: “I can move myself” (Mohanty, 1984, p. 27). This possibility, this “kinaesthetic freedom” (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 133), refers to a sort of tendency to produce those kinesthetic circumstances that would permit the optimal conditions of givenness of the perceptual object. In usual perceptual experiences, in fact, spatial objects are never fully given in intuition with respect to all their sides and aspects: visual perception only grasps the front side of an object, whereas the backside and other parts of the item fall entirely outside of the visual field. However, we always claim to see the entire thing and, also in reflection, the side properly seen refers to

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the as-yet-unseen sides and to the thing as a whole (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 116). Anthony J. Steinbock defines this way of givenness of the perceptual object as “paradoxical,” for it gives us itself in a natural disposition as a whole and its being in-itself is only constituted as a being in-itself-for-us (Steinbock, 1998, p. XLIII).

Husserl defines “authentic (*eigentliche*) appearance” as what is actually seen, whereas he calls the apperceptive surplus, or the empty co-intention, “inauthentic (*uneigentliche*) appearance” (Husserl, 1973b, §16 e passim). The authentic character of the perceptual act derives from its original self-givenness in intuition, “in its physical (*leibhaft*) presence” and not by means of an image or of a conventional sign representing the object. This intuitiveness comes from the complex of sensuous data interwoven with the apperceptive act (Bernet et al., 1993, pp. 117–118). The apperceptive surplus, instead, lacks sensuous data and the determination of its possible fulfilment depends on the kinesthetic courses. Therefore, the dynamization of the constitution process occurs through kinestheses, since the partiality of the authentic appearance implies the necessity of a supplement, according to a co-implied horizon pointing to diverse possibilities.

In this sense kinesthetic and representational sensations together belong to the content of “the animating ‘apprehension’” and their common aim is “to make a representation possible,” albeit kinesthetic sensations join in “without themselves representing” (Husserl, 1989, §46). In fact, only sensuous data provide the material determination of the intentional object, its qualitative covering. Nevertheless, since they are also characterized by their pre-empirical extension, the sensuous field, as a nexus of manifold sensuous data, corresponds to a pre-empirical system of positions with a qualitatively discontinuous covering. The system of positions and its qualitative determination are thus phenomenologically correlative concepts. For this reason, “the kinaesthetic system can be explored only within the motivational nexus that combines it with adumbrations of a qualitative sort and with hyletic fields of materially determined content” (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 134). The fact that appearances have a place, as horizon of potentiality, depends on the possible actualization of the kinesthetic course (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 136). This course is free (*leiblich*) and such freedom is an essential element of the constitution of spatiality (Husserl, 1952, p. 58).

Taking for granted this dimension of potentiality, kinesthetic and sensuous experiences are intrinsically arranged according to a system of correspondences, which is defined by Husserl as a system of the *wenn-dann* (Husserl, 1952, pp. 57–58), that is to say: if a certain kinesthetic modification would occur, then a certain change in the appearance would happen.

This structure includes a moment of possibility since the movement is present only at its unactual state (Altobrando, 2010, p. 123). Formally it is a potential moment that can be actualized. This implies that, within the field of

consciousness, the kinesthetic course is not initially given as something present but just as an “available” experience, an experience that can be produced *beliebig* among others.

This dimension of possibility depends on one of the two elements that articulate the manifestation: in every appearance Husserl distinguishes the “Intention-toward” (*Intention-auf*) and the “Quasi-Intention.” The “Intention-toward” corresponds to the full intention, since every appearance presupposes the occurrence of a visual sensation. It is the actual intention, regarding the appearance, that occurs and produces a double fulfilment: *a parte ante*, it fills the intention concerning the previous appearance; *a parte post*, it fills itself (Husserl, 1973b, p. 188). The “Quasi-Intention” is, instead, neither full nor fulfilling, since no visual sensation corresponds to it. Its main feature is its own very possibility to take place, which means that if a different kinesthetic modification would occur, it would become an “Intention-toward.” We can deduce that both these kinds of intentions are sorts of non-independent parts, “moments of the apprehension”: each instantaneous impression is therefore composed by the “Intention-toward” and the totality of the “Quasi-intentions.” These latter are mandatory to conceive the object as “having other profiles” or, in other terms, to perceive it as a three-dimensional object.

It is important to highlight that Husserl claims all profiles, including the hidden ones, manifest themselves perceptually but the constitution of an item as “having other profiles” is performed, according to Husserl, thanks to a specific kinesthetic modification: the rotation, i.e., the circular motion of our body around the object (Marchesi, 2017, p. 236).

In general, kinestheses perform a constitutive function of the thing, as unity of manifold appearances. For example, two typical specific kinesthetic modifications are expansion and turning, thanks to which we have, respectively, the constitution of an object that exceeds the margins of the field of view and the constitution of the three-dimensional character of the thing. The notion of expansion is connected to that of “surrounding environment,” which should be carefully distinguished from that of “visual field” (Marchesi, 2017, §12.2). The structure of the kinesthetic motivation consists of two determined multiplicities, a succession of kinestheses ($K_1; K_2; K_3$) and a succession of appearances ($b_1; b_2; b_3$); they are arranged in modifications which, respectively, coincide on a temporal basis ($K_1-b_1; K_2-b_2; K_3-b_3$). This connection manifests the objective figure but such figure remains intrinsically incomplete, since many other modifications are still possible. The connection is an association motivated by kinestheses: the kinesthetic modification (K_1-K_2) produces the appearance modification (b_1-b_2) and this fact causes the association, respectively, between items of the two successions (K_1-b_1 and of K_2-b_2) and also between corresponding modifications [$(K_1-K_2)-(b_1-b_2)$].

The associative unities between kinestheses and appearances, as well as between their respective changes, motivate a certain way of determination for each profile (for example, the uniform coloration). The kind of kinesthetic modification, which indeed permits this progressive acknowledgment, is, as we said, rotation.

Husserl defines it as “cyclical,” since it creates a loop of images. Rotation results in any case from the orbital movement that we can make with respect to the object, be it along the “left/right” or “up/down” axes. Therefore, it could be said that it is by virtue of the rotation that the vision of a profile, whether presented or not, is constituted (Marchesi, 2017, p. 242). In this sense, rotation grants access to the three-dimensional character of the thing and, in a broader sense, makes the notion of “perceptual horizon” intelligible.

Broadly speaking, we could say that kinestheses form a system of subjective capabilities that “is actualized in the momentary kinaesthetic situation [and] is perpetually bound to a general situation in which bodies appear, i.e., that of the field of perception” (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 134). In a pre-phenomenological language, we could say that the kinestheses as bodily sensations are gathered in different systems of possible movements of organs (eyes, head, hands, and so on), which correspond to different forms of possible fields of appearance (visible, tactile, and so on) in such a way that each modification of the kinesthetic system causes a different focusing of the visual field (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 131).

Modifications of appearances may occur even with involuntary movements of the bodily organism¹ and gradually these turn into habitual kinesthetic processes, as familiar forms of free behavior (also belonging to the “I can” practical dimension). This produces a layered structure with typical series of modifications, according to a hierarchical order, intrinsic to the various systems. With respect to visual perception, the aim is the progressive expansion of the visual field or the gradual construction of the spatial object (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 133). Husserl correlates this graduated formation of ever more comprehensive kinesthetic systems with the constitutional achievement of the perceived object. However, insofar as the intentional object is also co-constituted by the apprehension of sensuous data representing it in its material determination, the constitution involves both kinestheses with their progressive ordered systems and sensational data.

With regard to the latter, the form of unification that allows to constitute the perceived thing as a unity of multiple appearances is mainly the temporal form of the flow of consciousness. The temporal unity is provided through syntheses that operate according to universal forms of connection: coexistence and succession.

¹ See, for example, the notion of “body schema” in Gallagher (1985, p. 548), defined as a non-conscious performance of the body taking up, for example, certain postures and movements with relation to a given environment.

However, a phenomenology of time-consciousness pays no respect to content (Steinbock, 1998, pp. XLIII–XLIV). The continuous synthetic coordination of appearances with the same appearing object requires a continuous synthesis of identification. This is provided by “a phenomenology of association” which inquiries “into various ‘primordial phenomena’ and syntheses,” like “the passive constitutive syntheses of similarity, uniformity, concretion and fusion (as modes of homogeneity), contrast, discretion, and prominence (as modes of heterogeneity), and gradation. What is central to these concrete associative investigations is the phenomenon of affection” (Steinbock, 1998, p. XLIII).

2. Interest and Motivation at the Level of Affection

By affection, Husserl refers to a “solicitation or pull to attentiveness” that might or might not demand for an egoic response. But this idea of “excitation” calls back to the concept of *Reiz*, which Steinbock translates with the term “allure” (1998, p. XLIV). In the physiology of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, it was interpreted as the principle of association and then as a causal connection between the physical body and the psyche of animal life. Husserl, keeping distances from mechanistic connotations, re-qualifies the concept of *Reiz*, bringing it into the *motivational* relation between the lived body (*Leib*) and the intentional objectlike formations within a lived context. At the same time, for Husserl it plays a role between the two processes of apperception and association, also due to its intrinsic link to the concept of “motivation” (Steinbock, 1998, p. XLV).

We could say with Steinbock that “relations of motivation permeate all dimensions of intentional life” (Steinbock, 1998, p. XLVII): at the level of the active sphere we recognize egoic motivations of interest, while, within the passive sphere, this same cognitive interest, yet deprived of the involvement of the Ego, is directed toward an adequate knowledge of the thing (and not, at this level, toward any esthetic enjoyment or practical-technical application). It expresses itself in terms of a fusion or connection of matters within a sense-field or in terms of kinesthetic motivations. Therefore, also kinesthetic paths depend on this specific interest, which actively motivates the kinesthetic course and, correlatively, the further perceptual course. We will provide thereafter a more specific analysis of the Husserl’s concept of motivation, limiting ourselves, for the time being, to stress its importance only incidentally.

In the transition from the passive to the active sphere, typified in the advent of egoic awakening through an attentive turning toward, one instigated by some pre-givenness turned into givenness, the progressive satisfaction of a cognitive interest bearing on an object depends on the synthetic coordination of appearances. The unity that results from the arrangement of manifold appearances under a sensuous

type is, therefore, an achievement of sensuous consciousness and it is a basis for the logical synthesis to produce the evident identity (Husserl, 1973b, §44).

To a deeper look, this unity is not introduced from outside, but it is already essentially prefigured in the content of every single appearance. The continuum of appearances is the realization of the possible further course of perception, as this course is implied in the horizon that belongs to inauthentic appearance (Husserl, 1973b, §§30–54). Yet, not all these anticipated perceptual possibilities have the same motivational force, they don't push the same way for their actualization. On the one hand, this differentiation in the field of possibilities stands from the connection of the inauthentic appearance with the related authentic one and with the retained, elapsed past continuum of appearances. On the other hand, it results from the specific interest of the perceiving subject, which guides kinesthetic paths. In this sense,

(t)he potentiality of the appearances, the being-able-to-let-them-take-their-course, as well as their way of playing within a certain scope, is a mediated potentiality and derives its sense from the immediate potentiality of the kinaesthesia. (Bernet et al., 1993, p. 136)

This means that kinestheses indirectly motivate not only the various types of scope in which appearances play or the sensuous fields belonging to the various types of sensations; they also motivate the course of the appearances or images. Therefore, we can distinguish between different kinesthetic systems and the continuous course of kinesthetic data within each of them.

3. The “Idiopsychic” Dimension between *Leib* and *Psyche*

Generally speaking, we could say that kinesthetic experiences play a fundamental role in the realization of the so-called *beseelenden Auffassung*, since, without them, there can be no perception of any given thing and, in general, no intentional experience. Only with the onset of the kinaestheses, their opening a free space of activity thanks to their dimension of potentiality (Husserl, 1954, §28), the psyche takes to the field, for it does not seem reasonable to attribute freedom to a physical corporeal body, no matter how “alive” it might be (Altobrando, 2010, p. 127).

In fact, in the lectures of 1925, collected under the title *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, Husserl shows that precisely at this *niveau* the *Seele* makes its real appearance in the world, in the form of a principle of “animation” (*Beseelung*) which determines the passage from the sensuous unity—which is expressly only receptive—to *Leib*, the lived body as such (1962, p. 132). The physical corporeal body is said to be animated due to kinestheses, having, this way, access to the psychic sphere: it has become the already mentioned sensuous-kinesthetic unity,

with its dimension of potentiality, in which the chains of stimuli and responses, of sensations and kinestheses, of appetites and instincts follow one another. On the borderlines of the sensuous unity, kinestheses allow the constitution of intentional experiences and this is the first call into question of intentionality.

Only by a second “higher animating moment [...] the body itself is said to be animated by the governing I-subject” (Husserl, 1977, p. 101). The intervention of the personal subjectivity by its I-acts on the body and on the surrounding world draws a sort of boundary. Following Husserl, it would be possible to identify the domain of the psyche in experiences that move from sensations to volitions. For example, in a distinction proposed by Husserl in *Ideen II*, we can discern between the psyche and the psychic subject, although the I-subject of the superior “animation” is not autonomous from the psyche.² The psyche embraces it, as a unit of such a magnitude that it dominates primarily the common discourse on the human subject and on the animal subject (Husserl, 1952, pp. 134–135). In order to characterize the psyche, disregarding the psychic subject, we could refer to its specific phenomena and experiences, i.e., “the present stock of lived experiences [that], as a totality, is dependent on earlier stocks of lived experiences” (Husserl, 1989, p. 143).

What does distinguish the psychic dimension from the receptive unity is indeed this form of self-determination, such that actual experiences do not just depend on actual circumstances, but also on already elapsed consciousness acts. In other words, thanks to the past experiences, a present action is determined according to different experienced possibilities and this presupposes that spontaneous acts might be possible, that is exactly what kinestheses allow. Husserl defines this dimension of the consciousness the “idiopsychic side”: every action or passion leaves a trace, which establishes a new habituality and reconfigures, at least partially, the entire psychic unit. The psyche takes certain “dispositions,” obtaining, on the basis of the traces left by each experience, a certain way of reacting to circumstances and therefore gaining a certain praxis that is repeated the same way as in the past. This memory of past experiences distinguishes the psyche from the kinesthetic unit and is the reason that kinestheses are not merely produced but even re-produced.

In this sense, it is only thanks to the possibility of reproduction that the abovementioned system of the *wenn-dann* can take place: the necessary condition

² We can say, according to Andrea Altobrando, that here Husserl claims both the external natural reality (*res extensa*) and the psyche could be understood under the form “substantial reality.” Thus, also the psyche would respond to a kind of causality called “dependence on modification,” according to which a physic event follows a corresponding psychical experience. The difference between the latter and a simple sensuous experience lies in the fact that the psychical experience depends on the actual stimulus, as well as the entire conscious history which took place until then (Altobrando, 2010, p. 129).

is that a present experience would be recognized as a sign of a past experience and, therefore, that the current action would be a response to the actual stimulus on the basis of the identification, albeit partial, between past and present experiences (to synthesize: if in Time₁ $A \rightarrow B$ then in Time₂, given $A^2 \rightarrow B^2$). Accessing the psyche corresponds to entering in a certain conformation of the unity of kinesthetic responses, a legacy of multiple past experiences. According to Husserl, the psyche is something that transcends every single psychic state and which, therefore, cannot be reduced to a precise and absolutely empirical-material causality. Nevertheless, the psychic unity has not yet risen to the stage of real freedom of decision (Husserl, 1973a, p. 78).

The faculty of determining kinesthetic courses rather than living, or undergoing, a simple extended course, could be considered as the first stage of an egological spontaneity; however, the real dimension of “possibility” is still absent. In such a consciousness unity there is no “experience of possibility” yet and, therefore, speaking of a free Ego is not yet possible in a proper sense. At this level, spontaneity itself remains subject to “instinctual” regulation, that is, to primary impulses, which ultimately decide on the kinesthetic courses that occur on each occasion.

According to Husserl, impulses can be already found at the level of sensibility and kinestheses are actually performed in order to satisfy them. However, if we consider the set of all these, more or less coordinated, impulses as a primal form of the egoic principle, we should admit that the Ego has to be already present at the level of sensibility. In that case, the distinction between psyche and psychic subject would become superfluous. On the other hand, if we sustain that impulses do not properly belong to the Ego, defined as the sensuous-kinesthetic unity, it is hard to understand in which sense we could say that the Ego has to be passively subjected to impulses. Actually, Husserl’s position about the status of the psychological Ego is often ambiguous and this topic gains further complexity with the addition of the theme of *Triebintentionalität* (see Brudzińska, 2019; Lee, 1993).

However, in order to give an account of the psychic dimension according to the narrow aims of this work, we shall say that the psyche is “blind” to what goes beyond sensuous data and impulses; the spontaneity that can be observed in this dimension remains related to an instinctual process, whose laws determine every kinesthetic course and, consequently, every action performed by the Ego. Certainly, the Ego, unlike the mere sensuous unity, cannot be reduced to an automatic process of reaction to external stimuli; nevertheless, the Ego remains subjected to the legislation of “its own” instincts which, so to speak, predetermine what it will do if a certain occasion arises. In this sense, the psyche would correspond to a certain “layer” of the consciousness unity, which presupposes a spontaneous activity but which can also be studied according to “causal” laws: the laws of motivation.

4. Associative Motivation

In §56 of *Ideen II*, Husserl notoriously introduced the concept of motivation, defining it as the specific law of spiritual life. This concept moves against the law of cause and effect peculiar to the “naturalistic” attitude and especially in contrast with the dominant conception about association, inherited by the empiricist tradition (John Locke, David Hume and John Stewart Mill). The relation between the concepts of motivation and association is more complex than it might seem and, far from operating on two different levels, they are deeply intertwined. However, in order to outline this operative common space, we must first clarify the role of the concept of association.

The empirical tradition has emphasized the dependence of representations on impressions, underlying the causal, materialistic determinism of internal and external experience. At least since Kant, the reproductive character of associative synthesis has been the only one stressed out (Brudzińska, 2019, p. 31). Nevertheless, the sensualist interpretation is not the only way to think the principle of association. In fact, by the turn of the century, in the subject and experience theories based on humanities (like, among others, Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics or William James’s theory on the unity of the individual stream of consciousness), the sensualist-objectivist and purely reproductive concept of association is juxtaposed to a more descriptive, meaning-founded and productive one (Brudzińska, 2019, p. 33). This double concept of association seems to reflect the theoretical and methodological difference between those subjectivity theories oriented toward natural sciences and those akin to humanities, which, indeed, respectively, consider either causality or motivation.

Already since the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was sharply critical about the first conception of association based on the empirical-inductive drawing out of increasingly higher generalities in the cognitive process, because of its epistemological implications. In fact, Husserl preferred to give a different understanding of the associative functions playing a pivotal role in the interpretation of the principle of unification within the subjective sphere: an understanding that concerns the principles of order, connection, and design of the experiential context and which, as Jagna Brudzińska suggests, can be assumed as *horizontal* according to its performance structure (2019, pp. 35–36). This kind of association is grasped as a context motivated by content that is implicitly based on subjective history or subjective habitus and its development.

Husserl makes it clear that wherever certain circumstances appear as signs for other ones, i.e., refer to other ones, this function of reference is based on a previously established connection between subjective experiences or dispositions. Furthermore, rather than to (rational) insight, this—one might

say “habitual”—motivational context of association of ideas is attributed to the qualities of (intuitive) tangibility. The connection of parts and aspects of phenomenal units is not to be gained through logical insight, inductive reasoning, or discursive talk, but is directly perceptible as a connection of references. The quality of the perceptible can best be interpreted as the competence of the cognitive intuition, which directly grasps the connections of the given (Brudzińska, 2019, p. 41).

In fact, although the concept of motivation is generally considered to deal with the sphere of position-taking (*Stellungnahmen*), in which reasons are assumed to connect several effective acts together, Husserl adds here a crucial distinction between this form of motivation, called “Vernunftmotivation,” in which the Ego is actively involved connecting acts of positing, and a different type of motivation, a “passive” or “associative” one. It consists in a structure of organization at the level of sensibility and can be described as a tendency to create associations between unities of the pre-egoic sphere of consciousness. In this case, the Ego does not play any role, neither as active nor as passive/receptive pole.

In other terms, Husserl acknowledges the existence of “motivated relations” within the immanent sphere of mental acts which do not necessarily call for an active participation of the Ego. The nexus of associations has the structure of a typical analogy (“the similar motivates the similar under similar circumstances”) in which the current appearance motivates the future appearance by virtue of the similar relation experienced in the past. It could be interpreted as the law of habit, but Husserl prefers to keep it distinct, since in the case of habits it is called into question the noetic quality of an act characterized as positing (*Setzung*): a habit is the tendency to repeat a belief or a particular act of positing in relation to a specific matter, whereas associations establish connections at the noematic level, that is, the level of the objective correlates of acts.

In the unity of the consciousness of a thing, the internal legacy, performed as motivated association, is connected to the rational motivation at a deep ground but it is passive. Associations produce a kind of conditioning of the form “if-then” (*wenn-dann*), a relation in which motivating and motivated factors arrange themselves in a “motivated” succession:

If I turn my eyes in such a way, if I produce a series of optical experiences in a certain way, then I must see such and such, etc. And what I see presents itself as the unity of a thing with these or those parts, and the mode of givenness of one part supports that of the other. If they are to be together Objectively as such and such, and if the one appears in a certain way, then so must the other, in correlation, under the given experiential circumstances. (Husserl, 1989, p. 238)

In fact, it is the appearance of a noematic correlate that motivates the appearance of other noematic correlates. Considering the co-appurtenance of them, we have an associative motivation of the form “in consequence of.” On the contrary, at the noetic level, when, for example, the drawing of a conclusion is motivated by the judgment in the premises, the willing by seeing, hearing, evaluating, and so on, a different motivational relation occurs: in this case the relation takes the form of a “being-co-given” (*Mitgegebenheit*), which means that the positing of an element motivates the positing of the other.

5. Motivated Kinesthetic Chains

The aforementioned one could be considered as a typical basic case of kinesthesia, for the change of the lived experience due to kinesthetic course maintains both that character of “arbitrariness,” typical of kinestheses as “spontaneous” acts, and that dimension of pre-conditioning due to past experiences. This passive/associative motivation determines the development of kinesthetic chains as a form of succession inside the perceptual flow, but more broadly it also determines the relation that, in the passage from static to dynamic “co-appurtenances,” motivates the correlation between kinestheses and sensuous data.

But, as Husserl claims, it does not always assume a connotation of necessity: “We do not say that in the unit of the stream of my lived experiences each lived experience is necessary, necessarily conditioned by the lived experiences which precede it and are co-lived” (1989, p. 239). Sometimes motivated conditioning is just the expression of the form of inner time-consciousness, that is, of a succession:

“Now this is” conditions the futural positing “Something will be” [...]. Here we have a judgement motivated by another judgement, but prior to the judgment the temporal forms themselves motivate each other. In this sense we can say that even the pervasive unity of the stream of consciousness is a unity of motivation. (Husserl, 1989, p. 239)

Relations of motivation permeate all dimensions of intentional life that is, broadly speaking, the active sphere in terms of egoic motivations of interest; the passive sphere, e.g., in terms of a fusion or connection of matters within a sense-field, or again, in terms of kinesthetic motivations; the transition from the passive to the active sphere, typified in the advent of egoic awakening through an attentive turning toward, instigated by some pre-givenness transformed into givenness.

The concept of motivation is deepened in the *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (Husserl, 1966, chaps. 1–4) with respect to *Ideen II* particularly in relation to the context of modalizations of being and belief: among the various modalizations

of evidence that may occur (doubt, annulment, repression and superimposition, disappointment, negation, affirmation), it is possibility that stands out as one of the most significant to the issue of motivation.

Husserl distinguishes between open and enticing possibilities: the first is putatively a possibility that can be fulfilled in an indefinite scope of determinations, where nothing special is requested. On the other hand, an enticing possibility will exercise a demand for a specific determination. Some possibilities will have more “weight” than others, some will speak in favor of or against a possible sense.

From Husserl’s explication of enticing possibilities, we can glean the noetic and noematic components of motivation. Noematically speaking, motivations stemming from the objective vector of the intentional relation can be understood as a “propensity to be”; noetically speaking, they can be understood as a propensity or enticement to believe and “to turn toward” attentively. It is at this point that we can see a transition from the passive sphere of givenness to the attentive turning toward in the lowest active level, namely, “receptivity.”

Husserl speaks of the demand of the enticing possibility as an “affective force” that is “in relief” or “prominent,” of the weight as being “strongly affective,” and noetically, of the fact that we are motivated not only when the thing exerts an affection or enticement on the Ego, but also when we yield to the affection either passively without egoic attentiveness or actively in an attentive turning toward.

Thus, every transcendent perception predefines a horizon of possible but motivated transcendent perceptions; that is, every transcendent perception implies a motivational structure. In such a structure, however, it can be noted that the motivation between the kinesthetic modification and its manifestation is explicit, while between the succession of kinesthetic modifications and the change of image that arises with the passage from a kinesthetic modification to another (K1_K2) it is implicit. This means that the implication is not necessary, but it makes for an “if-then” legacy that indicates an empirical duty *a posteriori*. It follows that the perceptual horizon has a relative indeterminacy or a generic determination, since the possibilities of concordance (*Übereinstimmung*) or conflict (*Streit*) between appearances and expectations, even in the case of unreality, are all “open” motivated possibilities.

6. Conclusions

Conclusively, we can understand the specificity of the kinesthetic experiences in Husserl’s analyses as acts which almost always have the qualification of being or not being carried out. Only when they are actualized or performed, they become

effective as potential experiences. It is precisely in this way that the *Leibkörper*, understood as a sensuous-kinesthetic unity, begins to become a *Leib*, i.e., when the Ego begins to enter the scene “functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality.” Having kinestheses the peculiarity of being experienced as producible “spontaneously,” they represent an interruption in the chain of cause and effect: the strong causal legacy is substituted with a new form of connection inherent to the experiences of the conscious flow, in which impulses and sensations are functionally linked. It could be said that kinestheses are put at the service of drive in order to gain certain sensations or to avoid others.

Thus, it means that α can refer to β because α is motivated by β but α is motivated by β because α is associatively joint to β . In a formula, the reference presupposes the motivation, and the latter presupposes the association. For these reasons, we can conclude that the kind of association that pre-determines the unfolding possibility of kinesthetic chains is motivational.

Summary

Within Husserl's theory of perception, the role attributed to kinesthetic sensations determines a phase of the perceptive constitution that marks the boundary between pure receptivity and a first form of self-determination of consciousness. Kinesthetic experiences are, in fact, characterized not just as acts that are performed but rather that *can* be performed, albeit according to predetermined paths.

This primitive form of ‘instinctive’ spontaneity of the Ego (linked to primal impulses) as realization of pre-established potentialities, characterizes what Husserl defines the ‘idiopsychic’ dimension of consciousness (Husserl, 1952, p. 135). However, although this level of consciousness unity presupposes a spontaneous activity, it can be investigated according to the ‘causal’ laws of motivation.

The phenomenon of motivation was notoriously introduced by Husserl in §56 of *Ideen II*, as a specific law of spiritual life. However, there are two possible forms of motivation, one in which the Ego is actively involved, and a second one, called “associative motivation.” The latter basically indicates the passive tendency of creating associations between unities of the immanent sphere. In other terms, Husserl acknowledges the existence of “motivated relations” within the immanent sphere of mental acts which do not necessarily call for an active participation of the Ego. In this sense, the relation between motivating factors and motivated elements could be considered a kind of conditioning of the form “because-therefore,” in which the two elements arrange themselves in a succession of experiences. This work aims to show that this very kind of association is the same that pre-determines the unfolding possibility of kinesthetic chains.

Keywords: Kinesthetic sensations, spontaneity passive motivation, association, “idiopsychic” dimension of consciousness.

Kinaesthetische Einheit als motivierte Assoziation

Zusammenfassung:

Innerhalb der Wahrnehmungstheorie von Edmund Husserl wird die Rolle der kinästhetischen Empfindungen genutzt, um eine Phase der Wahrnehmungskonstitution zu bestimmen, die die Grenze zwischen reiner Empfänglichkeit und einer ersten Form der Selbstbestimmung des Bewusstseins markiert. Tatsächlich werden kinästhetische Erfahrungen nicht nur als Akte charakterisiert, die ausgeführt werden, sondern auch als solche, die ausgeführt werden *können*, wenn auch nach vorbestimmten Pfaden. Diese primitive Form der "instinktiven" Spontanität des Egos (verbunden mit urzeitlichen Impulsen), als die Verwirklichung zuvor festgelegter Potentiale, charakterisiert das, was Husserl als die "idiopsychische" Dimension des Bewusstseins definiert (Husserl, 1952, p. 135). Obwohl eine spontane Aktivität vorausgesetzt wird, kann diese Ebene der Bewusstseinseinheit nach den "kausalen" Gesetzen der Motivation untersucht werden. Bekanntlich wurde das Phänomen der Motivation von Husserl in §56 der *Ideen II* als spezifisches Gesetz des geistigen Lebens eingeführt. Es gibt jedoch zwei mögliche Formen der Motivation, eine, in der das Ego aktiv involviert ist, und eine zweite, die "assoziative Motivation" genannt wird. Letzteres zeigt im Wesentlichen die passive Tendenz an, Assoziationen zwischen den Einheiten der immanenten Sphäre herzustellen. Mit anderen Worten erkennt Husserl die Existenz von "motivierten Beziehungen" innerhalb des immanenten Bereichs der mentalen Akte an, die nicht unbedingt eine aktive Teilnahme des Egos erfordern. In diesem Sinne könnte die Beziehung zwischen motivierenden Faktoren und motivierten Elementen als eine Weise der Konditionierung der Form "wenn-dann" betrachtet werden, in der sich die beiden Elemente in einer Abfolge von Erfahrungen anordnen. Diese Arbeit soll zeigen, dass genau diese Form der Assoziation die gleiche ist, die die Entfaltungsmöglichkeit von kinästhetischen Verbänden vorgibt.

Keywords: Kinästhetische Empfindungen, Spontanität, passive Motivation, Assoziation, "idiopsychische" Dimension des Bewusstseins.

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