

THE POSITION OF NATO AND GREAT BRITAIN ON THE CRISIS IN SOVIET- ROMANIAN RELATIONS DURING THE AUTUMN 1968 AS REFLECTED IN BRITISH DOCUMENTS

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Abstract. During September-November 1968 there was a crisis situation in the Romanian-Soviet relations, generated by the criticism that the Romanian government formulated for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 23, 1968. This crisis came to the attention of decision-makers in the United Kingdom and Allied bodies within NATO. Both the British Cabinet and the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries held several meetings in which the issue of Romania and Yugoslavia was discussed in the context of Soviet threats. The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office visited Romania and discussed with Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu. This article aims to present debates within the NATO and the UK bodies on the political crisis in the Romanian-Soviet relations from the autumn of 1968 and the position adopted by them against a possible Soviet invasion in Romania and Yugoslavia.

Key words: Romania, Great Britain NATO, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer

1. Introduction

On August 30, Dean Rusk [1], the United States Secretary of State had a meeting with Dobrynin [2] Soviet ambassador in Washington. From the very beginning Rusk told Dobrynin that the relations of the USA with Czechoslovakia had not been particularly good but the U.S. government considered that the country had the right to exist. He asked what possible justification could be for the military action against the Czechs conducted by the Soviet Union and its partners in the Warsaw Pact, Especially in view of the fact that there was no external threat, nor any attempt by Czechoslovakia to leave the Warsaw Pact. He then told the Soviet ambassador that the U.S. government took very seriously the statement made by Dobrynin on 20 August that the Soviet Union did not intend to threaten the U.S. interests. He pointed out that among the U.S. interests was Berlin

and he emphasized especially the gravity of any move against Berlin in the current situation. He said that the U.S. Government did not trust Ulbricht [3]. He concluded by saying that he would be at Dobrynin's disposal at any time during the day or night. Dobrynin then asked whether the U.S. Government would study the oral communication and comment on it. Rusk said he would indeed be studying and that the only comment he has is about references to revanchist and imperialist threats. He said "there was not external threat, no C.I.A. plot, no hostile intent on the part of NATO or any other power". This concluded the exchanges with the ambassador [4].

On 31 August, at the instigation of Harland Cleveland [5], the current NATO secretary general, called a crash meeting of heads of delegations. This was ostensibly for a briefing and discussion about Romania, but

in fact provided an opportunity for Cleveland to circulate to his colleagues the communication made by Dobrynin to Rusk in Washington a night before. Cleveland also informed NATO representatives of the discussion which followed between Rusk and Dobrynin. The British representatives said that “a similar communication had been made to the Foreign Office. No other representative had knowledge of his government having also been addressed. About Romania the discussion was quite inconclusive, there being insufficient intelligence to enable a view to be formed whether the Russians would invade or not. The Chairman of the military Committee asked whether the SACEUR could be authorized to declare a state of military vigilance immediately after the entering of the Warsaw Pact troops into Romania. He was advised that if the SACEUR required any further authority than that which he has already been given for covert measures, he should himself address a request to the Council” [6].

2. British analysis regarding a possible Soviet attack against Romania and Yugoslavia

On 5th September 1968, the Foreign Office prepared a note of analyses in which they discussed the consequences of a Soviet attack of Yugoslavia.”. Yugoslavia, which has never been in the Warsaw Pact; which has always been proud of having won its own freedom in the war and created its own revolution has never been a satellite and was one of the founding members of the non-aligned club. An attack on Yugoslavia would therefore show that there had been a radical change in Soviet policy from a conservationist policy (involving military force if necessary) designed to keep the Warsaw Pact intact, to an expansionist policy, prepared to use military force in order to put down a country (admittedly a communist country) whose attitude the Russians found embarrassing. If that change in Soviet thinking had come about, it could contain the most serious implications for their attitude to yet other countries, e.g. in Asia Minor or the Middle

East. The consequences of an invasion of Yugoslavia for the balance of power in Europe and the security of NATO were obvious. Greece, and then Turkey, would become highly vulnerable. The whole of the Eastern Mediterranean would be directly threatened. Soviet forces would face Italy across the lengths of the Adriatic. The Soviet occupation of Albania, could well lead to Chinese reactions. It is most unlikely that the Chinese would give the Russians serious trouble on their borders, but they might be tempted to adopt a more forward and aggressive policy towards North Vietnam.”

The following courses of action might be considered, either in advance of an invasion and in the hope of discouraging it, or after it had started and with the purpose of supporting the Yugoslavs:

If the Russians were to issue an ultimatum to the Yugoslavs, with a time limit, NATO countries could expect to get heavy support in the Security Council and in the Assembly for a resolution calling on the Russians to refrain from making an attack. Because Yugoslavia has for so long been one of the leaders of the nonaligned group they would expect that support to be far stronger and more vocal than it was the case when Czechoslovakia was invaded. Whether or not an ultimatum was issued it would be most important for the Yugoslavia to raise the matter in the Security Council as soon as they felt themselves threatened. The Russians would undoubtedly apply a veto in the Security Council. The issue would then be taken to the Assembly and the British government might expect strong condemnation there too. This would serve as a very important deterrent for the Russians.

“Although some of the measures considered below would almost certainly require consultations in NATO, the only actions which might be taken by NATO itself would involve or imply NATO assistance to Yugoslavia (i.e., in effect a commitment by NATO) ranging from the supply of arms to a declaration that NATO’s interests would be vitally affected, to a commitment to intervene militarily, or to the formal

admission of Yugoslavia as a member of the Alliance.

The supply of arms (supposing the NATO machinery could be devised to cover a collective provision of arms) would require staff discussions. Staff discussions between Yugoslavia and NATO could not be kept secret and would be generally interpreted as going beyond the supply of arms. NATO might find itself moving towards a deeper commitment than merely providing arms.

A declaration that NATO's 's vital interests would be involved would mean that if Yugoslavia were nevertheless attacked and NATO failed to intervene, the creditability of the alliance would have been severely damaged.

On the other hand, the British government should expect to encounter the usual difficulties in the United Nations. Once the Debate was launched in the Assembly some Afro-Asians might take the line, as they have done over Czechoslovakia, that European countries only show concern when Europe is affected, and might try and back-pedal. Others might be frightened of standing out against the Russians. Nevertheless, the British government thought that there would be a strong deterrent element in United Nations reactions both in the Security Council and in the Assembly, provided Yugoslavia raised the matter sufficiently soon and forcefully.

So far, as specific United Nations action is concerned, sanctions through the United Nations would seem to be ruled out. But in the face of determined Russian opposition British government could not expect the Security Council to authorise the stationing of observers on the Yugoslav border. The Secretary-General would certainly not take any such action without Security Council approval. Nor could British government see any circumstances under which from a UN guarantee could be devised for Yugoslavia. This would again require Soviet acquiescence, which would not be forthcoming. The outcome of the discussion in the UN would be critical for the future of the Organisation" [7].

On 6th September, the British Prime minister, Harold Wilson, [8] discussed with the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart [9], and the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey[10], the situation that might arise from any Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. The defence secretary said that any unilateral British commitment was excluded. Britain's government need to act in concert with certain other NATO powers and possibly with the general concurrence of NATO, but not necessarily with the Italians (for obvious reasons) should be associated with British; and it might be useful, in the general context of our European policy, to have as many other reliable decided that action along these lines should be taken, it would seem preferable that nothing about it should be said either to the Yugoslavs or to the Russians until a direct Soviet threat to Yugoslavia seemed to have been established; and he agreed with the Prime Minister that a Russian invasion of Romania could well be the first stage towards the establishment of such a threat.

The Foreign Secretary re-emphasized that he did not expect any early invasion of Yugoslavia; and he remained sceptical whether help on the lines suggested by the Defense Secretary could be effective. But, clearly the matter should be discussed with the Americans and with certain other NATO countries. He thought it was essential that this should be done in great secrecy. The Prime Minister agreed.

An additional argument for an early discussion with the Americans was the risk that, with their Presidential Election in the offing, Nixon might say something tough about Yugoslavia which Humphrey would feel obliged to cap. The sooner therefore that a responsible attitude had been expressed by the United States Administration, the better.

After some further discussion it was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would concert with the Defense Secretary instructions to Pat Dean [11] in Washington to discuss the matter with the State Department, and in particular to agree with them on which other NATO countries should be approached [12].

3. The Visit of Michael Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Romania

Between 8-11 September 1968, at the invitation of the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Corneliu Mănescu, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael Stewart and his wife visited Romania. The secretary of state had a meeting on 9 September 2018 with Corneliu Mănescu [13] the minister of foreign affairs, and Nicolae Ceaușescu the president of the State Council of Romania. On 10 September, he met Ion Gheorghe Maurer [14], president of the Council of Ministries. On 10 September, Stewart informed the Prime Minister that the meetings during the visit to Bucharest were over. Stewart considered that meeting with Maurer was by far the most productive. Maurer told him they were personally afraid of the situation they were in. He hoped that the Soviet-Czech agreement ended in those days in Moscow will work. If it does not work, the Romanian government could be in great difficulty. Nothing should be done to shame the Czechoslovak government.

This also meant abstaining from an action of the UN. The main objective of the Romanian government was, in those difficult circumstances, to restore the trust and friendship between the Romanian people and the Warsaw Pact member states. As expected, the Romanians reiterated their strong criticism of the two military blocs. Even if they did not say it directly, the Romanians questioned the value of their participation in the Warsaw Pact, which under those circumstances did not protect them from their own allies and which was a source of danger.

The Romanians were very cautious about the events in Czechoslovakia. Maurer said the reaction of the Czechs and other countries to the invasion was to control the use of force. They answered very honestly to Stewart's question that they can not answer the rationale of the Soviet invasion. They did not know why the invasion took place so soon after the meeting in Cierna and Bratislava. When he urged Maurer to

answer, he replied that those issues that are of concern to Stewart are torture problems for him. Ceausescu accepted that trade links with the UK would intensify, showing that it is good that this proves that in those times the Romanians have friends in the West and that despite the events in Czechoslovakia, the relations with the Western states have not been interrupted.

For Stewart, Ceaușescu was not an impressive figure like Tito. He found him primarily a party leader. His speech was seasoned with communist generalizations in which he thought he would believe: when he found himself on a weak ground, he was tempted to retreat behind a dialectical smoke screen. Although he seemed confident and spoke authoritatively and impressively about Romania's development programs, he was betraying a lack of experience in international affairs. Stewart had testified that he had seen him in a state of stress.

In Stewart's opinion, Maurer, on the other hand, was ready to speak frankly about Romania's difficulties. He was a brave man with considerable intelligence and experience. Although his position was not far from Ceausescu's vision, he has greater clarity and finesse. Stewart noticed that there was no crisis in Bucharest and the streets were filled with cheerful people.

Stewart came to the conclusion that Ceaușescu and his colleagues will continue to do their utmost to improve relations with the West. They hope the Moscow deal will work and they will not do anything to jeopardize the Czechs. They will remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact and will avoid any action that would offend the Russians.

Stewart was sure the "Romanians were delighted with his visit to Bucharest. They have told him several times that the British attitude towards the recent events has been of great help to them. The visit was in line with their policy of having a Western minister to speak frankly about their fears"[15].

On 12th September 1968, when the Prime Minister saw the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he said that he had read with much interest the telegrams and other records of

the Foreign Security's discussions with the Romanian leaders, during his visit in this country, and had been grateful for the interesting impressions conveyed in the Foreign Secretary's personal telegram to him [16].

The visit seemed to have gone very well. The Foreign Secretary agreed, but again underlined the substantial difference in tone and content between his discussions with Ceaușescu and Mănescu, as compared with his exchange with Maurer. In the case, of the latter there had been two highlights. First the exchange about blocs, when Maurer had used the argument that being a member of the bloc only protected you against countries from which you really needed no protection. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs had replied that this might be true of Maurer's bloc. Secondly, he had been much stuck by Maurer's remark (after Stewart had referred to Romania as an ally of Soviet Union) that "as for the Soviet Union, Stewart could have that ally any time he liked". The Prime Minister commented that, in reading the reports, it had occurred to him that Ceausescu seemed very much of a Gomulka [17] type figure; whereas Maurer was closer in kind to Rapachi style [18].

4. The Soviet war of nerves against Romania and Yugoslavia

On October 2, a British report recorded: "Given their preoccupation with Czechoslovakia, it remains British government assessment that the Russians are conducting a war of nerves against Romania and Yugoslavia rather than contemplating military action against them in the near future. The likelihood of an attack against Yugoslavia (which we would expect to be preceded by action against Romania) must depend greatly on the political assessment of the Russian objectives and of how the Soviet leaders would weigh the balance of advantage overall. The British Government has nevertheless taken a first look at the purely military consideration involved in a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia and the following summary of this may be useful.

Plans for the attack would be based on three main requirements:

- (A) Surprise
- (B) Early capture of Belgrade
- (C) Sealing off of Yugoslavia's frontiers with neighboring states surprise.

It would be difficult to conceal the build-up but attempts would be made to discuss military deployments under the cloak of exercises and defensive measures. Tactical surprise would be assured because the initiative would rest with the Warsaw pact.

Early capture of Belgrade would ensure the collapse of organized resistance at the centre and could be achieved by a combination of parachute drops and air landings (which could be carried out at night) and thrusts by ground forces from Hungary and Romania. Airborne troops would seize bridges at Novi Sad and Panchevo. Land forces would attack principally from Hungary, but a thrust from Romania gives the shortest route to Belgrade. Frontiers with Austria and Italy would be sealed by ground forces based on Hungary. Political difficulties and mountainous terrain suggest that there would be no point in violating the Austrian Territory. Frontiers with Greece and Albania could be sealed by ground forces based on Bulgaria, with possible assistance of paratroopers and airborne forces.

The Dalmatian coast presents the greatest difficulties and the ground forces would not get there quickly. Amphibious forces would have to be embarked in the Black Sea and moved to Bosphorus. The most likely solution would be to seize population centers with airborne forces and to couple this with defensive patrols in the Adriatic by the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in order to cut off supplies.

Assuming resistance (as the Russians would have to do) and that the forces would be mainly Russian, the British government assessment was that three Soviet divisions and their associated air forces, plus four airborne regiments for parachute operations would be required to achieve the objectives outlined above, leaving aside later requirement for total subjugation.

It would take about 15 days to assemble and deploy these forces to their start points in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Western intelligence would become aware of the associated troop movements but would be unlikely to be able to predict the moment of attack.

This presents no problems. Sufficient airlift was available for the operations outlined above. Tactical air forces should travel to transport troops to aerodromes in Hungary, Bulgaria and eventually in Romania, and this could never be detected, although it will take the form of a Warsaw Pact exercise. If there was no exercise, cover aircraft movements would be delayed until the last minute and the warning period would be short" [19].

A Dutch source said that bands from Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and the USSR were preparing to invade Romania on November 22nd. It was estimated that the Polish contingent had 150,000 soldiers, a bundle of tanks, two air battalions, six signal companies, two aviation regiments. There was also signalled the presence of Marshal Grechko [20], commander of the Warsaw Treaty troops in Transnistria.

Another Polish source informed that the Polish and Hungarian troops had received orders to prepare to invade Romania [21].

On 22nd November, in a Foreign Office telegram it was shown that the British basic assessment mentioned that a Soviet attack on Romania was not imminent and it was taken from the Davis-Macovescu conversation that this was the current Romanian appreciation of the situation.

Nevertheless, the British government remained concerned over rumours of an invasion. In this situation the British intelligence noted various bits and pieces of information in addition to the original rumour of an invasion in the early hours of 22nd November.

The British government had an instance of a western military attaché did not see an aisle to travel in an area in Poland near the Soviet border. This looks more serious in the face of the unconfirmed reports of the military movements in the Soviet Union and in these circumstances the red star's

report of Marshal Grechko's visit in Kishinev raises questions.

Similarly, the Foreign Office did not know what Warsaw pact chief of staff Stemenko [22] has been doing on what appears to be a lengthy visit to Bulgaria (since at least 7 November).

In part, the British view that a Soviet attack on Romania seems unlikely is based on the British impression that the Romanian-Soviet tensions may be lower than they were before, but the Foreign Office, of course, knows much less about this than others. In this connection there was a welter of rumours on the subject of Warsaw pact exercises to be held in Romania. The Foreign Office, has noted a public denial (carried by AFP) that such an exercise was imminent.

The Foreign Office, has also heard speculations that there were negotiations on the matter of a future pact exercise in Romania in which Moscow has been said to have raised demands for rights to transit Romanian soil and to station troops there; we, of course, have no independent knowledge of this account [23].

On November 22nd, the British Ambassador in Bucharest, sir J. Chadwick [24], called the current Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Macovescu at 8 a.m. and spoke as instructed in Foreign Office telegram no.638. He gave him the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 of FO telegram no.637.

Macovescu asked the ambassador to personally express the thanks of the Romanian government for this message to the British secretary of foreign affairs. He said he already had broadly similar information from another government (which he did not specify) consistent with a new move against Czechoslovakia, some of the movements being designed to screen this main operation. However, the information the ambassador Chadwick gave about Grechko and Stemenko was new and the Romanian government would have to think it all over again very carefully. He said that the Romanians had themselves heard from their own sources a rumour that an invasion was to take place yesterday. It had not happened.

Macovescu said that ambassador's reference to Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian preparations for troop redeployment should be Soviet, Bulgarian and Polish. They had reports of some Polish movements, but there had been no Romanian movements [25].

5. The end of tensions: Romania joined the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty of spring 1969

In the spring of 1969, Romania joined the other states of the Warsaw Treaty and signed the Appeal of the member states of the Warsaw pact to the countries of Europe. The text was as follows: "The member states of the Warsaw Pact— The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Romanian Socialist Republic, and the USSR, the members of the session of the political consultative body

-the express thesis wishes that their peoples want to live in peace and have good-neighbourly relations with the other peoples of Europe, and their firm resolution to contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of security and cooperation in our continent.

They, therefore, call upon all European states to unite their efforts for the consolidation of peace and security in Europe. The present and future of the peoples of Europe are inseparable from the safeguarding and consolidation of peace in our continent.

Real security and firm peace can be guaranteed if the European states serve. The relaxation of tension by their intentions, deeds and all their might and, by taking realities into consideration, set themselves the aim of settling the matured international problems and of developing multilateral cooperation on an all-European basis. The road leading towards good-neighbourly relations, to the creation of confidence and to mutual understanding depends on the will and efforts of the peoples and governments of all European countries.

The Europe of today, as it has developed after the Second World War, represents more than 3 large and small countries with different social systems, different geographical situations, and different interests.

By the will of history, however, we have to live side by side, and this fact cannot be changed by anyone.

A growing number of Governments, Parliaments, Parties, and political and social personalities feel its responsibility towards the present and the coming generations and for preventing a fresh war conflict in Europe. But there are also forces which exercise their influence in Europe, forces which do not want to contribute to European development by the settlement of controversial questions and by peaceful agreements but instead, on the basis of new military Programmes worked out for decades, march up fresh divisions and rockets.

There act in collusion with them also those who have not drawn the necessary conclusions from the Second World War and from the smashing up of German militarism and Nazism. By their machinations they increase tension and create complications in international relations. The states taking part in the session also consider it their duty to do everything within their power for the purpose of saving Europe from the danger of a fresh war conflict and, on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, of giving a wide scope to the development of cooperation between all the European countries), independently of their social systems. The prevention of further military conflicts and the strengthening of economic, political and cultural relations between the states, on the basis of respecting the equal rights, independence and sovereignty of the countries, constitute questions of vital importance for the peoples of Europe. A system of firm European security would create the objective possibility and necessity for us to realize great plans connected with the utilization of power, communications,

water and air space, and with the well-being of population of the whole continent.

It is precisely this that is common, and that must form the basis of European cooperation. The fundamental pre-requisite for European security is the recognition of the existing European borders-including the Oder-Neisse border, the inviolability of the borders between the German Democrat Republic and the German Federal Republic, the existence of the German Democrat Republic and the German Federal Republic, and that the German Federal Republic should renounce her claim to sole representation of the entire German people, and to the possession in any form of nuclear weapons. West Berlin possesses a special status and does not belong to West Germany.

A meeting as soon as possible of the representatives of all the European states concerned, at which they would determine, on the basis of the joint agreement, the order of the convocation of the conference and specify the questions to be included in its agenda, would be a practical step towards the consolidation of European security. At the same time, we are prepared to examine any other proposal concerning the preparations for the conference and the method of its convocation. The states taking part in the session of the political consultative body call upon the countries of Europe to cooperate in the convocation of the all-European conference and in the creation of the pre requisites required to ensure the success of the conference and to fulfil the hopes the peoples attach to it. For the purpose of realizing this important initiative which would be a historic event in the life of the continent, the states attending the session solemnly call on all the European states to strengthen the atmosphere of confidence and to refrain, therefore, from any deed that might poison the atmosphere of the relations between the

states. They call upon the states of Europe to turn from general declarations of peace to concrete deeds and measures serving the relaxation of tension disarmament, cooperation between the peoples, and peace. They call upon all European governments to unite their efforts so as to enable Europe to become a continent of fruitful cooperation between nations enjoying equal rights, and a factor of stability and peace of the whole world and for mutual understanding” [26].

Conclusions

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty has caused concern within NATO member states. Both the United Kingdom and its NATO allies have feared that the Soviets will continue the aggression by attacking Romania and Yugoslavia. A series of scenarios have been developed on possible USSR remedies against the two countries. It has also been taken into account what response the United Kingdom will give in such a situation. In the case of an attack against Romania, it was found that the options were very limited and nothing could be done. In the case of Yugoslavia, it was concluded that the occupation of this country would have led to a change in the balance of power in Europe. Several variants were considered, but it was established that this was to be done in coordination with NATO allies and, above all, the USA. Between October and November 1968, the Soviets led a real war of nerves against Romania and Yugoslavia. They spread a series of fake news culminating with the news that Romania's invasion would occur on November 22, 1968, at 4 am. Finally, Romania's relations with the USSR normalized and in the spring of 1969, Romania joined the appeal of the states of the Warsaw Treaty to the countries of Europe.

References

- [1] David Dean Rusk (February 9, 1909 - December 20, 1994) was the Secretary of State of the United States from 1961 to 1969 under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

- [2] Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin (16 November 1919 - 6 April 2010) was a Russian state man and a Soviet diplomat and politician. He has been a Soviet ambassador to the United States for more than two decades between 1962 and 1986.
- [3] Walter Ernst Paul Ulbricht (June 30, 1893 - August 1, 1973) was a German communist politician. Ulbricht played a leading role in the creation of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) during the Weimar Republic and later (after spending the years of the Nazi regime in exile in France and the Soviet Union) in the early development and establishment of the German Democratic Republic in Germany East. As the First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party from 1950 to 1971, he was the main leader in East Germany. After the death of President Wilhelm Pieck in 1960, he was also the head of the East German state until his death in 1973.
- [4] PRO, Kew Gardens, PREM13/2638, Telegram 2598 of 31st August 1968 from Washington to Foreign Office.
- [5] Harlan Cleveland (January 19, 1918 - May 30, 2008) was an American diplomat, educator and author. He served as a diplomat in the time of Lyndon B. Johnson's in the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1965 to 1969 and Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs from 1961 to 1965.
- [6] *Ibidem*, Immediate UKDEL NATO to Foreign Office, telegram number 533.
- [7] *Ibidem*, A Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. F.O. Internal Note from 5th September 1968.
- [8] James Harold Wilson, Baron Wilson de Rievaulx (March 11, 1916 - May 24, 1995) was a British politician, a member of the Labour Party who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom between 1964-1970 and 1974-1976.
- [9] Robert Michael Maitland Stewart, Baron Stewart of Fulham, CH, PC (November 6, 1906 - March 13, 1990) was a British member of the Labour Party and a Fabian socialist who served twice as Secretary of State in the first cabinet of to Harold Wilson.
- [10] Denis Winston Healey, Baron Healey, (August 30, 1917 - October 3, 2015) was a British Labour Party politician who served as State Secretary for Defense from 1964 to 1970, Chancellor of Exchequer 1974 -1979 and vice-president of the Labour Party from 1980 to 1983.
- [11] Sir Patrick Henry Dean (March 16, 1909 - November 5, 1994) was the Permanent Representative of the Great Britain to the United Nations between 1960 and 1964 and United Kingdom Ambassador to the United States between 1965 and 1969. He was also President of the Joint Information Committee.
- [12] *Ibidem*, Report on the discussion between Prime minister Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, London 6th September 1968 Downing Street 10.
- [13] Corneliu Mănescu (born February 6, 1916, Ploiești - June 26, 2000, Bucharest) was a Romanian politician, who was, among other things, Romania's foreign minister.
- [14] Ion Gheorghe Maurer (born September 23, 1902, Bucharest - February 8, 2000, Bucharest) was Prime Minister of Romania between 1961-1974 and President of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly of the Romanian People's Republic during January 11, 1958 - 21 March 1961.
- [15] *Ibidem*, Telegram 424, Bucharest to Foreign Office, 9th September 1968
- [16] *Ibidem*, Bucharest telegram No.416 of September 8)
- [17] Władysław Gomułka (born February 6, 1905, Białobrzegi near Krosno, Poland, Austria-Hungary, died on 1 September 1982, Warsaw, Poland) was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party in Poland between 1956 and 1970.
- [18] *Ibidem*, Report on the discussion between Prime minister and Foreign Secretary, London 12th September 1968 Downing Street 10.
- [19] *Ibidem*, British report October 2 1968

- [20] Andrei Antonovich Grechko (October 17, October 1903 - April 26, 1976) was a Soviet general, Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Minister of Defense.
- [21] *Ibidem*, Warshaw to Defence Office telegram 144, 10 November 1968.
- [22] Sergey Matveevich Stemenko (February 20, 1907 - April 23, 1976) was a Soviet general who served as Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces between 1948 and 1952. In August 1968, he was promoted the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact.
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