PAIRING PROBLEMS: CAUSAL AND CHRISTOLOGICAL

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ABSTRACT. Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegwon Kim's pairing problem. On the original pairing problem, so argues Kim, we lack a pairing relationship between bodies and souls such that body A is causally paired with soul A and not soul B. Merricks, on the other hand, argues that whatever relations dualists propose that do pair bodies and souls together (e.g. causal relations) are relations that God the Son has with all bodies whatsoever via his divine attributes (e.g. God the Son could cause motion in any and all bodies via his omnipotence). So if we count these relations as sufficient for embodiment, then dualism implies that God the Son is embodied in all bodies whatsoever. I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul's existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship.

KEYWORDS: Christological Anthropology, Christology, Embodiment, Mind-Body Dualism, Physicalism

Introduction

Dualism, the anthropology that sees the human person as composed of both the physical body and the immaterial soul or immaterial mind, has fallen on hard times, even among Christians. Many Christians are beginning to opt for its primary rival, *physicalism* or *materialism*, which takes the human person as strictly physical or material in her constitution, though perhaps still instantiating immaterial properties—such as mental or moral properties (see, e.g., Green 2011: 481–82; Zimmerman 2007: 13; Brown 1982: 122; Levering 2012: 1; Godzieba 2003; Yates 2017: 9–21). Many objections that Christian physicalists deploy against dualism center around numbering problems. For example, if I am not the same thing as my body (perhaps I am an immaterial soul or mind or self), then there are questions about what is currently sitting in my chair. It seems that I am sitting in my chair. But my body is also also sitting in my chair. So must dualists now admit that there are two sitting

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things in the one chair, my body and myself? Is it not simpler to say that there is only one thing sitting in this chair, namely my body which is my very self?

Continuing this theme of numerical problems, Christian physicalists can allege that in conceptually tearing asunder what is really one and the same, dualism results in a series of incoherencies regarding the relation between the allegedly two components, the immaterial self and the material body. One famous argument along these lines in the wider anthropological debate is the causal pairing problem, which alleges that it is utterly mysterious or incomprehensible how a particular soul is coupled with a particular physical body. However, within the Christian subset of the wider anthropological debate is a more troubling, Christological version, what I shall call the Christological pairing problem. On this argument, it is alleged that whatever relation is said to obtain between a particular soul with its particular body is also had by God the Son in virtue of his divine nature, which then means that if that relation is sufficient for embodiment, then God the Son is embodied in all human bodies whatsoever. Dualism, then, jeopardizes the unique status of the Incarnation. In this essay, I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul's existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship.

The Pairing Problems Portrayed

The original causal pairing problem centers around the mystery of how a particular soul is coupled with a particular body since they are distinct objects of distinct kinds. Jaegwon Kim provides one of the most recognized renditions of the original causal pairing problem:

[T]wo guns, A and B, are simultaneously fired, and this results in the simultaneous death of two persons, Adam and Bob. What makes it the case that the firing of A caused Adam's death and the firing of B caused Bob's death, and not the other way around? What are the principles that underlie the correct and incorrect pairings of cause and effect in a situation like this? (Kim 2008: 78–79)

According to Kim, we have two options before us: Either we can trace the lineage of spatio-temporal causation, eventually finding the genesis of the causation in the respective weapons responsible for said deaths or we can look for a *pairing relation* that holds between A and Adam and B with Bob, but not in between. However, these two options are unavailable for dualists regarding a particular soul and its corresponding body. Consider the same two men, Adam and Bob, and their respective souls. Both Adam and Bob are prompted to raise their right arms at the exact same time. Why does Adam's soul cause Adam's arm to rise, but not Bob's? And vice-versa for Bob's soul and Bob's arm, but not Adam's arm? Since the soul is immaterial, it cannot be spatial,

and therefore one cannot trace a spatio-temporal causal lineage backwards to ascertain the causal genesis. Thus, one must resort to a special pairing relation instead. But Kim asserts that no such pairing relation exists. Ergo, soul-body causal interaction is deeply mysterious if not altogether incoherent.

However, many dualists presuppose that there are more relations between a particular soul and its paired body than just the causal, such as direct epistemic access (see, e.g., Moreland and Rae 2000: 202–03; Swinburne 1997: 146, 151–52; Taliaferro 2001: 111–12; Lowe 1996: 37–38). That is, I know my body and what occurs to and around my body in a privileged, immediate way that all other humans lack. Thus, causal *and* epistemic relations are jointly sufficient for embodiment since I can raise my arm but not yours and I know my body in a way that I do not know your body. Thus, the conjunction of causal and epistemic relations is constitutive of embodiment.

However, while this is seemingly adequate for solving the original causal pairing problem for ordinary humans, it may not be for ensuring that Jesus Christ is embodied in his body. Although there are hints of such an argument elsewhere (e.g. Senor 2011: 94–95; Cross 2008: 190; Marmodoro and Hill 2010: 471–72), including earlier in history (e.g. Hick 1989; and possibly Anselm 1998: §7), the most detailed and sophisticated version is forwarded by Trenton Merricks (Merricks 2007: 284–88).

The core of this Christological version of the pairing problem is that any proposed relation that renders the soul as embodied in a particular body would also render the Logos embodied in that very same body in virtue of his divine attributes, jeopardizing the exclusivity of the Incarnation. So, argues Merricks, dualism would entail the absurd idea that God the Son is incarnated in more than just his body, but also in yours and mine and everyone else's if these relations are constitutive of embodiment. Merricks is not playing unfairly, for theologians have long considered the relationship between the body and the soul to be analogous to the relationship between Christ's two natures (McGuckin 2004: esp. 198–201).

Consider how Bob's soul is capable of lifting Bob's arm, but Adam's soul is not. No amount of sheer will can enable Adam to lift Bob's arm directly. The omnipotent Son, however, can directly lift Bob's arm. There may never be an occasion where the Logos actually would lift Bob's arm, but he is capable of lifting it in the same way Bob is capable of lifting his own arm even while Bob is not currently doing so, say if Bob was relaxing on a couch while watching television (Merricks 2007: 285). Similarly, Bob comes to know the world around his body and things within his body through his body, but Adam cannot. Yet the omniscient Logos likewise knows the same things as Bob does, including what it is like to have Bob's body (Merricks 2007: 287). So, given that God the Son has direct causal control over and epistemic access to all bodies whatsoever, what makes Jesus' body uniquely his and no one

else's body his? If dualists cannot isolate the Incarnation to involve only the Logos and his first-century Jewish body, then dualism is at odds with the exclusivity of the Incarnation in two important ways: Due to the omni-properties, all three Trinitarian Persons would be incarnate and every single human body would enjoy hypostatic union with the divine nature. [Surprisingly, Swinburne entertained the notion of God being at least partially embodied in every physical object (1993: 104–05), a position he seemed to have changed recently (2016: 111–14)]

Further, Merricks is skeptical of rehabilitation efforts (Merricks 2007: 290–92). He anticipates that any relation *R* that is considered to be embodiment-constituting will either be reducible to some variety of the causal control or epistemic access relations or if dualists claim that embodiment is a cluster of relations—of which is included causal, epistemic, and mystery relation *R*, then unsavory results follow. The Son would have with every single body all of these relations that are seemingly constitutive of embodiment except for *R*, which he has exclusively with his body. That would make the Son more embodied in his body than he is with all other bodies. But embodiment does not seem to be a degreed sort of phenomenon. Worse still, putting all of the weight on relation *R* so that it is sufficient for embodiment leads to a skepticism of embodiment. Perhaps I have my present body because of *R* even if I lack causal and epistemic relations to it, say if I was in a coma. This is plausible in this case, but it seemingly cannot be universalized, for I could have relation *R* with the body of Queen Elizabeth II, and yet retain my causal and epistemic relations with the body typing this essay. That means, despite my rather intimate interactions with this present body typing this dissertation, I am actually embodied in the body associated with Queen Elizabeth II. Surely, this is absurd.

Finally, although Merricks does not himself explore this possibility, the unfortunate phenomenon of demon possession likewise jeopardizes the coherence of dualist conceptions of embodiment. Though demons do not exhibit the omni-attributes, the Gospels seem to depict them as capable of achieving causal power over (Mark 5:3–5) and epistemic access through (Mark 5:6) human bodies that they possess, whatever possession might mean. Yet we would not want to admit that demons are thus embodied or incarnate. And if we reject these relations as being sufficient for demons being embodied or incarnate, then these same relations are likewise insufficient for the Logos to be embodied and incarnate. Something more is needed. [I am, however, open to the possibility that demon possession is a mockery of the Incarnation in a like manner that the plurality involved with the demon named Legion (Mark 5:1–13) might be a mockery of the Trinity]

That something more that escapes the above objections, argues Merricks, is numerical identity. He applies a property dualism version of animalism to

Christology and demonstrates that this model yields a relation between the Logos and his body that he lacks with all other human bodies and that neither the Father nor the Spirit possesses with any human body, including Jesus':

Physicalism [of the animalist variety] has a straightforward account of embodiment. You have a body if and only if you are *identical* with that body. I assume that, in the Incarnation, God the Son is related to the body of Jesus just as you and I are related to our respective bodies. So, *given physicalism, God the Son, in the Incarnation, is identical with the body of Jesus*. That is, in becoming human, he became a body. (Merricks 2007: 294, emphasis added)

Merricks goes on to write that 'to say that the Son became a physical object is just to say that he came to have physical properties,' reinforcing that animalist versions of the Incarnation subscribe to an abstractist view of the human nature (Merricks 2007: 296). Further, 'if part of being human is having physical properties' then one must accept 'the Son's coming to have physical properties, that is, coming to be a physical object' (Merricks 2007: 297). However, as per property dualism, the Son would continue to instantiate non-physical properties as well.

One is immediately struck with the odd assertion that God the Son would become identical with a material object, as Leibnizian identity would clearly demonstrate that they are not identical: If two objects are really the same object, then 'they' must share all properties alike (that is, any property the one has the other must have as well). And, by *modus tollens*, any two objects that do not share all properties alike are therefore not identical. God the Son existed prior to his body having existence. But it is impossible and absurd for his body to have that very same property since his body could not have pre-existed his body. So, then, the Logos has one property not shared with his body. Ergo, he is not in fact identical with his body. Anticipating such an objection, Merricks responds:

Some might worry, however, that if we say that God the Son became identical with a human body, we are somehow committed to 'a bodily theory of personal identity' that rules out his having existed without a body. But this worry is misplaced. Just so long as *being a body* is a contingent property of what has it, it is possible that that very thing—that very body—could have existed even though it was not a body. (Compare: I am identical with a professor; but this very thing—this very professor—could have existed (and did exist) without being a professor.) (Merricks 2007: 296 n. 20)

Further, Merricks counters initial worries of incoherence with an unexpected move—the rejection of *kind essentialism*, which says:

if something is a member of a natural kind, then it is essentially a member of that kind. Presumably, physical objects constitute a natural kind. And so, given kind-essentialism, physical objects are essentially physical objects. Nothing can start out lacking an *essential* property and then later acquire it. Given all this, kind-essentialism implies that something that starts out as a non-physical object cannot possibly become a physical object. In this way, kind-essentialism threatens the physicalist's account of the Incarnation. (Merricks 2007: 296)

Merricks enervates the shock of rejecting kind essentialism by pointing out that dualists should do likewise since human souls appear to constitute a natural kind as well (Merricks 2007: 296). That is, according to kind essentialism, whatever is a human soul must be so necessarily. Nothing can become a human soul that was not already a human soul to begin with. Thus, even dualists should jettison kind essentialism lest they curtail the possibility of God the Son becoming a human soul. Indeed, some dualists have done so under different terms, such as Thomas V. Morris' distinction between *being merely human* and *being fully human* (Morris 2001: 65–70). Since both the physicalist and the dualist should discard kind essentialism, the apparent impossibility of God the Son's becoming purely physical evaporates. It is not any more crazy to believe that God the Son could become physical than it is to believe that God the Son could become a human soul. Either requires a rejection of our intuitions concerning kind essentialism.

The identity relation between the Son and his body does not obtain between the Father or the Spirit with any body (Merricks 2007: 297). Further, the identity relation between the Son and his human body means that being human and being embodied are one and the same thing, not two things as dualism might entail—i.e. one could be human by being a disembodied human soul (Merricks 2007: 297). Merricks thus provides a rather simple solution his own Christological Pairing Problem: Being human is the same as being embodied and there is no pairing problem because there are not two things in need of pairing. The Logos simply is identical with his strictly physical human body.

The Christian dualist now faces the difficulty of navigating the contested waters of embodiment: she must give an account of embodiment that avoids the Scylla of the original causal pairing problem and the Charybdis of the Christological Pairing Problem. That is, she must give an account for why a particular soul is united to a particular body and only that body and no other.

The Pairing Problems Expanded

The brilliance of Merricks's argument is that candidates that would solve Kim's causal pairing problem would fail the Christological version. Because dualists generally focus more on defending the existence of the soul rather than explicating its relationship with the body, resources are scant for

rebutting both pairing problems. Let us survey a handful of somewhat familiar or natural candidates gleaned from dualist writings to appreciate more fully how far-reaching Merricks's Christological pairing problem is.

Spatial Location

Contrary to Kim's contention that dualists cannot appeal to spatial locations, a dualist could break ranks with standard dualism and propose that a soul is spatially co-located with its body (see, e.g., Bailey et al. 2011: 356–59; Cortez 2008: 168; Goetz 2010: 42–43, 54–55; Hasker 1999: 192; Rodrigues 2014: 212–14; Goetz and Taliaferro 2011: 40–46; Moreland and Craig 2017: 265, 270; Mullins 2017: 154–55). This is not entirely antithetical to our intuitions. Consider where Bob is. It is not just the case that Bob's body is at a scene of a crime; Bob himself is there at a scene of a crime. So, in addition to direct causal control over and epistemic access to his body, Bob is also spatially co-located with his body but not Adam's body.

But as it is with causes and knowledge, so it is with spatial location. God the Son would have every single human body in virtue of being omnipotent, omniscient, and—on some understandings of this attribute—omnipresent (Hudson 2008; Zagzebski 2013: 17–18). Not only does Scripture portray God as being present everywhere at once (e.g. Psalm 139:7–12; Jeremiah 23:23–24), but some theologians speculate that the hypostatic *perichoresis* is the same in kind as the omnipresence of God, though distinct in degree (e.g., Loke 2014: 101–02; Crisp 2007: 19–27, 33, 149–50). So, on a theoretical basis, if God were to increase his presence in all bodies to the same level of intensity as in the Incarnation, then we would all be hypostatically unified. More catastrophically, the Father and the Holy Spirit likewise are omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, and so they too would have causal relations with, epistemic access to, and be spatially co-located with every human body in existence (see also Cross 2002: chp. 10; Leftow 1999: 226; Crisp 2016: 113–14; Sturch, 1991: 51). Further, as Merricks had already anticipated, a plausible argument could be made that reduces spatial location with causal and epistemic relations anyway. That is, God the Son need not be present in a space by occupying or extending into that space, filling up that emptiness but rather is present in an area of space by having immediate causal efficacy and epistemic awareness over that area of space (Cross 2003). So God the Son is *omnipresent* in virtue of his *omnipotence* and *omniscience*, and we have already seen how God the Son's omnipotence problematizes the sufficiency of causal relations to bring about embodiment.

Additionally, the problem of demon possession arises again. While demons can enter into causal and epistemic relations with human bodies, we want to deny that they are embodied. The same could be said of spatial location with human bodies (Matthew 8:31). Assuming we wish to continue denying that demon possession amounts to embodiment, then demon possession

provides a strong counterexample against the joint sufficiency of causal, epistemic, and spatial relations for embodiment.

This raises the question whether a dualist should return to what seems to be the most popular candidate for embodiment: causal relations. Perhaps, then, a dualist could repair or refine her concept of efficient cause such that it is exclusive between a person and her body.

Instrumentation

Another strategy a dualist could employ to solve both pairing problems is to differentiate different kinds of causation and then restrict Christ to having a specific, embodiment-constituting one with only his body and no other. So while Christ in virtue of his omnipotence could lift all arms whatsoever, that is not sufficient for embodying him in those bodies. Rather, he is embodied only in his body in virtue of some other causal relationship.

Perhaps that causal relationship is something like extending oneself to an external object by outsourcing crucial functions, normally cognitive or causal, to that external object to such a significant degree that the person is dependent upon that external object (see, e.g., Cross 2011: esp. 189–97; Marmodoro 2011; cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998). That external object is then said to become a part of the person. The need to outsource that crucial function to the external object may be the result of damage or dysfunction, such as in the case of having a pacemaker implanted to replace one's natural ability to regulate one's heartbeat (a strong dependence). But one could outsource a function out of convenience or efficiency, say, in the all-too-familiar and embarrassing case of outsourcing one's memory to one's smartphone (a sort of self-inflicted dependence). This extension of the self seems intuitive, from martial artists and soldiers with their weapons to musicians with their instruments regarding their external object as extensions of themselves. Further, psychological research suggests that we seemingly feel through our tools and psychologically regard them as extensions of our limbs (Cardinali et al., 2009).

However, it is doubtful that such an outsourcing has ontological import, let alone being capable of rebutting the Christological pairing problem. As powerful as this outsourcing may be on a functional, phenomenological, or psychological basis, it does not render one what are really two. Counterexamples are easy to construct. For example, I have a woefully undeveloped sense of direction. When driving the family to an unfamiliar place, I outsource my sense of direction to my longsuffering wife. Yet, we would not want to say that my wife is somehow now a part of me as an extension of my mind or self (that would bring a whole new meaning to becoming one flesh!). This sort of outsourcing, unfortunately, is increasingly becoming more frequent as my wife must also remind me of a great many things, from items on the grocery list

to household projects I have been neglecting. And we can easily imagine the outsourcing intensifying as I get older.

Further, if this kind of cognitive or functional outsourcing is sufficient for embodiment, then it would also jeopardize the Exclusivity Thesis's affirmation of the *sui generis* sense of the Incarnation of the Son if anyone could be incarnate in anything or anyone else, whether that be my being incarnate in my wife or God being incarnate in the prophets whom he sends (Arcadi 2018: 258–59); Marmodoro 2011: 224–25).

One could make use of Thomas Aquinas's distinctions in instrumentation, that some instruments are external or common (Latin: *exterior* and *commune*) while others are one's very own (Latin: *proprium*) (Arcadi 2018: 176–79). For example, I can put down the hammer that I am using to repair furniture and another, say my daughter, could pick it up and use it for cracking open geodes. Thus, the hammer is an external or common instrument. In contrast, I use my hand to brush my teeth, but that instrument is unavailable to my daughter for her to brush her teeth because my arm is my own. However, such a distinction already presupposes some other, more fundamental, relation that renders the Christ's human nature as his very own instrument as opposed to an external or common instrument (Arcadi 2018: 259–60). [One promising lead that a dualist could pursue and resource is a distinction between an uninterrupted instrumentation versus a punctuated instrumentation, suggested in (Williams 2018: 79). My thanks to David Moser for his helpful guidance on this matter]

Animation

Perhaps that more fundamental fact is that the soul also animates the body. That is, the soul makes the body alive—that conceptually elusive but still meaningful quality of organisms in contrast with rocks, clouds, and bicycles. From the very first moment of existence, the soul makes the body alive, and that begins the soul and body's stamping upon one another. The soul's departure from the body, that is the cessation of this relation, makes the body dead. This is distinct from mere motion since I am still embodied in my body even if I do not move my body (say I am anesthetized for eye surgery). But I hardly count as embodied if I, the soul, cease to make my body alive. So perhaps Christ makes his Jewish body alive in a way that he does not with my body.

Yet, the physicalist could add the animating relation to the growing collection of relations that fail to rebut the Christological pairing problem. Not only would a thorough biblical exegesis take us too far afield, but it has also been done better elsewhere. Suffice to say, whatever it is that human souls do to make their bodies alive, surely the Holy Spirit will do at the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:36, 42–46; cf. Romans 8:11), most explicitly in the way Paul

the Apostle describes the body now as *soma psuchikos* (perhaps best translated as the ‘self-powered body,’ i.e. existing in autonomy from God [cf. 1 Corinthians 2:14–15; 15:50]), whereas at the resurrection the body will become the *soma pneumatikos* (perhaps best translated as the ‘Spirit-powered body,’ (i.e. existing in connection with the Holy Spirit/God) (Wright 2003: 343–56; Fee 1987: 869–76; Thiselton 2000: 1266–85). The reason, it seems, that my body will die is because I, limited and corrupted person that I am, am the sole power source. But my resurrected body will never die because it is the Holy Spirit who fuels it with life. In fact, some NT commentaries describe the Spirit’s relationship with the human body here as a sort of embodiment (Wright 2003: 352–54; Hays 1997: 272). [A similar puzzle was lurking in the Alexandrian proposal that since the Logos animates the entire cosmos, surely he could animate a human body which is a part of the cosmos (see, e.g., Grillmeier 1951: 81–84). Contemporary scholars are undoubtedly hesitant to believe that the Logos animates the entire cosmos on pain of embracing panentheism (see, e.g., Cooper 2006: esp. 323–324, 337–38). However, none of the NT scholars here need to embrace panentheism, for their exegetical work only points to the human bodies, not the entire cosmos, being animated by the Holy Spirit.]

Perhaps the dualist will point out that the animation of the Spirit has not yet occurred—being reserved for the eschaton as the fullest expression of union with Christ (Wright 2003: 351–52). However, such a concession only delays the Christological Pairing Problem rather than solves it. The exclusivity of the Incarnation does not seem temporary. Whatever relations the Christ has with his body that constitutes his embodiment should not then be extended at the eschaton with all other bodies.

Formal Causation

Another avenue that a dualist could take in solving both the causal and Christological pairing problems might be to appeal to the Aristotelean/Thomistic causal distinctions. Perhaps the human soul acts as a form for the human body and that is sufficient for embodiment. To reiterate, an Aristotelean understanding sees the form as only a configurational property. A parcel of matter gains the power to cut because it has the structure, the form, of a knife. Another parcel of matter gains the power to be alive because it has an essence, the form, of an organism. Physicalists can sign off on that conception. But if the soul is more than a property, as per Thomas Aquinas, then it seems that a substance can serve as a formal cause. Upon the cessation of the formal causal relationship between the human soul and the human body that is the former animating the latter, the human body transforms into something else—namely a corpse. Perhaps, then, the Logos serves as the formal cause for his body and no other.

Still, a form—whether it is a configurational state, property, or itself a substance (complete or otherwise)—is supposed to be the aspect of an object that answers the question, ‘What sort of thing is this?’ If a collection of matter is being informed by the form of a knife, then that parcel of matter is a knife, endowed with the powers associated with knives. If a parcel of matter is a human body and is made alive, it must be because the soul is the right kind of form, a human animating form. However, as the Logos is a divine person, it is hard to see how he could serve the role of a form for a *human* body. Should the Logos inform a body, that body would be divine (Cross 2002: 58, 70; van Driel 2009: 273) [Unless a dualist wishes to broaden out what formal causation means beyond the familiar Aristotelian-Thomistic conception, such as in (Moreland and Rae 2000: esp. 10–11, 14, 201). Such a broadening, however, might encounter other problems like those discussed above in the animation section].

The dualist could then propose that the Logos undergoes some sort of change so as to qualify as a human soul, and then as a human soul he enters into a formal causal relationship with his body. Michael Rea has extended the reach of the hylomorphic rubric of form+matter to apply to nearly everything, including immaterial objects. For the Incarnation in particular, Rea hypothesizes that the Son became the human soul of Jesus in the sense that the Son plays the role of the form while a human nature plays the role of matter for the human soul, and the joint compound itself plays the role of the form for the human body of Christ (Rea 2011: esp. 149–50). But the problem is not alleviated by removing the Logos by a step, for it is hard to see how the Son’s informing the immaterial counterpart to matter results in a human, rather than a divine, soul.

Cartesian Trialism

Some experts in Descartes’ thought have recently objected to the standard interpretation of Cartesian dualism that claims that the philosopher radically tore asunder what is really one. These scholars argue instead that Descartes thought the body and soul join into a hybrid psycho-physical unit that is neither wholly material nor wholly immaterial—a third sort of thing, hence the label *trialism* (Cottingham, 1985; cf. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Descartes 2007: 69–71). This sounds akin to human gametes—once joined, the sperm and the egg are irrecoverable, creating a new third thing, namely the child. This would go a long way to resolving the original causal pairing problem. A soul is paired with a body if and only if it is joined in such a way as to form a third new thing that is neither physical nor immaterial but some hybrid of both. This theory would solve Kim’s causal pairing problem quite easily. Adam’s soul is paired with his body and not with Bob’s body because

Adam's soul and Adam's body are joined together to form a hybrid psycho-physical unit neither wholly material nor wholly immaterial.

However, if the joining of body and soul is like this, and the Logos is identical with the human soul, then it is hard to see how dualism does not fall afoul of Eutychianism: the Christ as the human soul mixes with the human body to produce a third thing, that is neither immaterial (a necessary property of divinity) or physical (a necessary property for human bodies). Thus, on this proposal, a *tertium quid* results. On a Chalcedonian understanding of the Incarnation, the Logos and his body must retain their respective properties whereas egg and sperm do not. If the Logos is not identical with the human soul, then it is hard to see how the Logos himself is embodied since this hybridization is, on this proposal, sufficient for embodiment.

Possible Future Solutions to the Pairing Problems

The dualist need not admit defeat and embrace Kim's and Merricks's anthropology that sees the human person as identical with her strictly physical human body. There are good reasons to reject Merricks's solution to the problem he raises, particularly whether it is coherent or not for God the Son to be identical with his physical body (McCall 2015; Van Horn 2010).

But rebutting physicalism does not immediately exonerate dualism. It could very well be that this exercise establishes a parity, albeit an undesirable one, between the two anthropological views—both are fraught with difficulties in accounting for the doctrine of the Incarnation. A dualist is free to attempt to rehabilitate any of the above views so that it can answer both of the arguments deployed by Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks. Or the dualist may explore other avenues. I suggest a few moving forward.

Divine Fiat

Perhaps the embodiment relationship between the body and the soul is nothing more than simply 'God did it.' That is, dualists can further argue that, in addition to these other relations, the soul is the final cause, the purpose, for the body. This particular body was made for this particular soul (Moreland and Rae 2000: 205); (Swinburne 2004: 200–12). My body was not made for Christ's particular soul, but rather for my soul. Perhaps something similar is occurring with Christ's human nature in general and his human body in particular (Pawl 2019: 51–52).

Physicalists might demur that final causation is merely conceptual hand-waving, a convenient God-of-the-gaps explanation. By God's whim and fancy is this soul paired with that body! Yet, such an explanation is perfectly reasonable for Christian theism. Just as one might presuppose agential causation when encountering a properly set dinner table, so too one might presuppose divine agential causation when reflecting upon the simultaneous

correspondence and distinction between the mind and the body (Swinburne 2004: chps. 2 and 9) The cause for such regularity would be an omnipotent God, for clearly ‘He can cause there to be the particular brain-event-mental-event connections that there are’ (Swinburne 2004: 209).

This correlation resembles *occasionalism*, the view that only God is the true cause of all our bodily acts (Hasker 1999: 195–96); Leftow 2001: 128, 196; cf. Farris 2017: 79). While it appears that I move my arm to sip my coffee when I intend to drink, it is actually God who knows of my intention who performs the function for me in some way, with various thinkers proposing a variety of means. However, Swinburne’s proposal here does not require God to intervene for every act of every human in the entire world for all of history. Rather, we do not have an inherent causal relationship with our respective bodies except what is granted by God. If this is right, then Christ’s embodiment is of the exact kind as our own. To each his or her own body by divine decree, including Jesus.

However, as convincing as I find Swinburne’s argument *from* the mind-body correspondence *for* God’s existence as an apologetic, it is incomplete for solving this specific theological and philosophical conundrum. It raises the difficult question of whether there is nothing intrinsic about the mind/body relationship at all and God must supernaturally create every single embodiment relation or whether God has put into place a general metaphysical law whereby this particular soul goes with that particular body. The former option is a strong claim indeed, for that is the creationist view of the origin of the soul. But then the dualist must agree that it is arbitrary for why a particular soul is coupled with its body. The Logos has his body and no other body just because God made it that way. On the other hand, if there is a general metaphysical law that God created for why a particular soul is embodied in a particular body, then the question remains: Why this particular body with that particular soul?

The divine fiat pairing might generate teleology for the soul and the body. So even if I fail to have causal and epistemic relations with my body—say from dysfunction or disease—I *should* have those relations because this is the body that was made for me. Stronger still, if I undergo a body swap of the sort frequently portrayed in fantasy and science fiction so that I have causal and epistemic relations with the body of an Olympic athlete, we can say, based upon teleology, that that body is not my body (sadly). Such a maneuver has promise, but on its own it seems like an anthropological counterpart to the divine command theory: this body is paired with this soul just because God said so. It may do the trick against both versions of the pairing problem, but it does not seem particularly satisfying. In fact, Merricks anticipates this maneuver, contesting that this would ‘allow the dualist who believes in the Incarnation to get all the ‘right results’, simply by *fiat*,’ that it ‘renders

embodiment an occult relation,' and makes embodiment 'completely mysterious and so is utterly implausible' (Merricks, 2007: 291).

Emergence/Traducianism

Perhaps the dualist can suggest that the body actually causes the soul's initial existence, such as in William Hasker's emergent dualism or some version of traducianism (Hasker 1999: esp. 188–97, 232–35; Karamanolis 2014: 197, 207). This is not like supervenience that many physicalists embrace whereby purely immaterial mental or moral properties might be possessed by a strictly physical human body, for the soul that emerges is a substance rather than a property. True, the soul does emerge from the threshold event—whether that be the joining of the egg and sperm or sufficiently complex neurological structure. But unlike the property of wetness coming about by a specific joining of hydrogen and oxygen, the soul can theoretically continue to exist apart from the body. So emergence is a stronger thesis than supervenience.

While this may go a long way to solving Kim's causal pairing problem, this may not solve Merricks's Christological pairing problem depending upon the Logos's relationship to his human soul. Some dualists speculate that God the Son is identical with his human soul (Moreland and Craig 2017: chp. 32; DeWeese 2007), in which case his body cannot give rise to his soul, for the Logos existed prior to his body. Stranger still, some dualists speculate the possibility of the human body giving rise to the human properties that the Word then assumes to become a human soul is considered in (Swinburne 1989: 60–61). However, this just seems terribly ad hoc as it is doubtful whether the creation of a human body could only give rise to just the human properties that the Logos then assumes to become a human soul rather than an entire human soul that qualifies as her own person.

If the Logos is not identical with his human soul, as advocated by compositional Christologists (see, e.g., Leftow 2002; Morris 2001; Pawl 2016), then perhaps Jesus' human body can give rise to his human soul. And while that may be sufficient for embodiment, the dualist would then need another relation between the Logos and the human body and soul such that the Logos is himself embodied. Which leads to my final suggestion.

Part-Whole Relationships

Perhaps the dualist could solve both pairing problems by way of composition. That is, Adam's soul is paired with Adam's body because the former has the latter as a part or they together are parts that compose a greater whole, namely Adam (Farris 2017). It may even be the case that Descartes himself held to such a view (Chappell 2011: 265–66; Skirry 2001; Broughton and Mattern 1978; Hoffman 2011). Whether this is a faithful interpretation of Descartes thinking or not, I shall leave for the Cartesian scholars. What is more important for my present purposes is whether this is coherent or not.

And such a body of views are explored among those Christologists, most notably in the debate between the so-called Model A and Model T interpretations (see, e.g., Flint 2011; Hasker 2015; Flint, 2015. So it may very well be that Christ has his body and no other body as a part or that God the Son is a part along with his human body and no other to compose a greater entity, that is Jesus Christ.

This may stand in tension with a certain version of divine simplicity, one that rejects any composition of parts in the one soul of Christ even if he has multiple properties. If a dualist were to explicate embodiment in terms of part-whole relationships, she could restrict simplicity to just the divine nature and concede that a divine person is not simple during the Incarnation.

These three suggestions appear to solve both versions of the pairing problem: They can account for why a particular soul is paired with a particular body in such a way that Christ has his body and no other body. Yet, further work must be done, as evidenced by the worries I raise. If nothing else, this exercise has shown how difficult it is to explicate embodiment in light of Christology and dualists can no longer afford to focus so much on defending the existence of the soul as to neglect theorizing how the soul relates to the body.

Conclusion

In this essay, I argued that Christians dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul's existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship in light of the Christological pairing problem. Since an orthodox Christology affirms the full humanity of Jesus Christ, Christology provides, in some way, important insight into anthropology (Cortez, 2018: 21). A minimal Christological anthropology sees Christology as warranting some important claims about humanity beyond issues like the *imago Dei* and ethics, while a more comprehensive Christological anthropology, such as one that Karl Barth would advocate, sees Christology as warranting ultimate claims about true humanity in all aspects. On either view, both the dualist and the physicalist must square her anthropology with Christology. If one's anthropology jeopardizes the coherence of an orthodox Christology, then so much the worse for that anthropology. And if dualists are unable to give an account for how each human person is paired exclusively with only his body, including the Logos at the Incarnation, then dualism risks being incompatible with Christian commitments.

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