Presentation

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This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of <italic>Ideen.</italic> The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an <italic>a priori</italic> knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of <italic>a priori</italic> knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory of essential insight presented in <italic>Ideen</italic> gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight.
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Ontology and Epistemology in Husserl’s <italic>Ideen-I</italic>

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I here present and discuss Husserl’s clarification of the genesis of modern empirical science, particularly its mathematical methods, as presented in his last work, <italic>The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.</italic> Although Husserl’s analyses have as their goal to redirect science to the lifeworld and to reposition man and his immediate experiences at the foundation of the scientific project so as to overcome the “crisis” of science, I approach them from a different perspective. The problem that interests me here is the applicability of mathematics in empirical science, to assess Husserl’s treatment of this issue in order to see if it can be sustained from a strictly scientific point of view regardless of philosophical adequacy. My conclusion is that it cannot. What Husserl takes as the “crisis” of science is inherent to the best scientific methodology.
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Science and the Lebenswelt on Husserl’s Philosophy of Science

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In the first part of my paper, we will journey through the general structure of the first volume of Ideas, from which we will be able to deduce the position of Volume II. After carrying out a general analysis of the noesis/noema correlation structure in Section III and having provided, in Section IV, the basics of a phenomenology of reason, the second volume of Ideas should study the general fields in which the objects of transcendental experience appear: the world, the animal being, and the spiritual or cultural being. The third, unwritten volume should have been devoted to the study of the superior products of culture, and science. Thus, the second part of this paper will show the place of Ideas’ second volume. The third part, the decisive one, will inquire into the position of the world and the place of the body and culture. Specifically, it will ask whether the experience of the body is understood to be an objective genitive or whether it is also understood, necessarily, as a subjective genitive. The same question will be asked about culture. An understanding of one as objective or subjective genitive radically alters the meaning of the pure ego.
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The Structure of Ideas: Problems for Thinking about the Pure Ego

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In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific phenomenological content of modalizations – in intentional acts – would be hard to explain. It would be impossible to understand why constant external factors (for instance, variations in the intensity of a stimulus) are accompanied by fluctuations in attention. It would also be impossible to understand the reasons why only the lived experience of causality – which I sharply distinguish from causality in the psychophysical sense of the term – transforms attention into a factor that allows the understanding of a situation by the subject who lives that experience. I claim at last that only the genetic analysis of Husserl’s late Freiburg period, with its distinction between primary and secondary attention, gives a full account of the relation between the thematic object, focused on an intentional attentive act, and the horizon that surrounds the object and gives it its ultimate meaning.
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The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention

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This article analyses the fundamental relationship between Husserl’s theory of reflection in the first volume of <italic>Ideas</italic> pertaining to a pure phenomenology and the two main concepts upon which transcendental phenomenology is grounded: namely, description and reduction. Although the concept of reflection was already used in <italic>Logical Investigations</italic>, Husserl revised it entirely thanks to his analysis of time-consciousness in the 1905 Lectures. Reflection thus appears as a key concept in understanding the ‘turn’ that led Husserl to deeply modify his descriptive method in order to move to transcendental phenomenology.
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Description, Reflection, Reduction

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This paper reads Husserl’s phenomenology as an attempt to solve the crisis of our civilization. It is well known that for him the deep roots of this crisis are related to a misunderstanding of the idea of rationality that leads to skepticism and relativism. It is also well known that in order to overcome this situation Husserl will propound a new idea of reason and rationality that will supposedly fulfill the old dream with which philosophy was born in Greece: To be <italic>episteme</italic>, rigorous science valid at all times and in all places. Taking this general thesis into account, the paper will defend that Husserl is a foundationalist thinker and that the idea of philosophy as <italic>strenge Wissenschaft</italic> is present throughout his whole work, including, of course, <italic>Ideen</italic> I. This in some way “classic” interpretation tries to discuss other recent ways of understanding the whole Husserlian project, particularly Dan Zahavi’s reading, in which the foundationalist position is downplayed.
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Yearnings for Foundation. The Idea of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and <italic>Ideas</italic> I

AHEAD OF PRINT

Volume 36 (2023): Issue 1 (December 2023)

Volume 35 (2023): Issue 1 (May 2023)

Volume 34 (2022): Issue 1 (December 2022)

Volume 33 (2022): Issue 1 (September 2022)

Volume 32 (2021): Issue 1 (December 2021)

Volume 31 (2021): Issue 1 (October 2021)

Volume 30 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 29 (2019): Issue 1 (December 2019)

Volume 28 (2018): Issue 1 (October 2018)

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Volume 26 (2017): Issue 1 (October 2017)

Volume 25 (2012): Issue 1 (October 2012)

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Phainomenon

Phainomenon is an international journal specializing in phenomenology.  It was founded in 2000 and has been published since then with the support of the Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, Portugal.  Phainomenon seeks to contribute to the development of phenomenological studies worldwide, stimulating original work in all fields of phenomenological research, as well as in the areas where phenomenology crosses paths with other philosophical traditions and scientific domains. Phainomenon also seeks to contribute to a better cognizance and understanding of the phenomenological tradition – both of its authors and its themes – accepting works that advance our comprehension of it.  Phainomenon publishes works in English (recommended), Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, and German. Contributions are accepted following a double or single-blind peer review process, always with external reviewers.  The current publisher of Phainomenon is SCIENDO, which belongs to De Gruyter Verlag,  Regularly, the journal has two sections: a general section, where papers are continuously received and published; and a thematic section, preceded by an announcement and a call for papers, sometimes under the responsibility of guest editors. The thematic section usually has a comprehensive theme, intended to encompass other philosophical traditions, as well as other disciplines belonging either to the social and human sciences or to the natural sciences.  Moreover, Phainomenon publishes book reviews and bibliographical notes and, though not on a regular basis, translations into Portuguese of fundamental texts belonging to the intellectual patrimony of phenomenology. Phainomenon is published twice a year, in Spring and Fall. All articles, notes, translations, reviews and other content can be accessed and downloaded for free thanks to our open access policy.  Phainomenon is financed through Portuguese national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., in the scope of the project UIDP/00310/2020.  ArchivingSciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process.  Journal SponsorshipCentro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaFacultade de Letras da Universidade de LisboaFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - Portugal 

Phainomenon

Volume 33 (2022): Issue 1 (September 2022)

Presentation

Ontology and Epistemology in Husserl’s Ideen-I

Science and the Lebenswelt on Husserl’s Philosophy of Science

The Structure of Ideas: Problems for Thinking about the Pure Ego

The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention

Description, Reflection, Reduction

Yearnings for Foundation. The Idea of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and Ideas I

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